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Judges have always played an important role in public life. One of the earliest 
and, by all accounts, perceptive pronouncements on the organisation and composition 
of the judiciary is to be found in the Old Testament:1 
 
 ‘This is no way to go about it. You’ll burn out, and the people right along with you. This is way 
 too much for you—you can’t do this alone. Now listen to me. Let me tell you how to do this so 
 that God will be in this with you. Be there for the people before God, but let the matters of 
 concern be presented to God. Your job is to teach them the rules and instructions, to show 
 them how to live, what to do. And then you need to keep a sharp eye out for competent men — 
 men who fear God, men of integrity, men who are incorruptible—and appoint them as leaders 
 over groups organized by the thousand, by the hundred, by fifty, and by ten. They’ll be 
 responsible for the everyday work of judging among the people. They’ll bring the hard cases to 
 you, but in the routine cases they’ll be the judges.’ 
 
 The challenges inherent in the administration of justice were a matter of 
pressing social concern in the Book of Exodus, some 3000 years ago. This 
dissertation is concerned with the same issues of adjudication in the superior courts of 
South Africa. The purpose is to challenge assumptions about who we believe should 
be afforded the privilege of adjudicating in a transforming society under the 
Constitution.2 This is an inquiry about the nature of justice. The practice of justice 
requires not only active advocates for the vulnerable, marginalised and people without 
resources; it requires that those who adjudicate in the superior courts protect, 
advance and enable ordinary citizens to live bigger, larger and more meaningful lives.  
 
 Chapter I opens with a simple question: what is it that judges do? The aim here 
is to try and pull the function, jurisdiction, and structure of the superior courts into 
sharper focus by addressing three vital questions: (i) How should we think about 
superior court adjudication? (ii) What are the forms of superior court adjudication? 
And, (iii) What are the limits and constraints of the current forms of superior court 
adjudication? This deductive process, I demonstrate, reveals the extent to which an 
uncritical and inaccurate understanding of what it is that judges do and where they do 
it prevails in South Africa.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 E Petersen The Message: The Bible in Contemporary Language (2002) Exodus 18:17-23. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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 This is also an inquiry about injustice. Injustice is the outcome of having 
skewed neighbourly processes, including adjudicatory processes, where some are put 
at an unbearable disadvantage by the social, economic and political realities 
operating in that society.3 It is here where citizenship begins to become meaningless. 
The consequence is that superior court adjudication is in urgent need of triage – 
matching the right issues with the right adjudicatory processes. I show that recent 
statistics and reports from over a decade of new dispute resolution forums in the fields 
of labour law and competition law, challenge traditional notions of superior court 
practice in profound ways and provide a catalyst for rethinking adjudication under the 
transformative mandate of the Constitution.  
 
With this deeper understanding of what judges do, Chapter II interrogates 
section 174(1) and (2) of the Constitution, which establishes criteria for judicial 
selection. The Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission4 litigation  
(‘HSF Litigation’) will be used as a basis for this analysis. The aim is to show that both 
the conceptions of ‘fit and proper’ and ‘appropriately qualified’ (‘constitutional 
requirements’) offered by the Helen Suzman Foundation (‘HSF’) suffer two serious 
defects. The first being that they tend to reinforce stereotypes about who we think 
judges should be, and second, the constitutional requirements are invoked broadly 
across superior court selection without a concomitant understanding of the nuances 
and subtleties involved in the adjudicatory processes at each level of the superior 
courts. I therefore provide a comparative analysis of the criteria used by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (‘JAC’) established in the United Kingdom in 2006,5 in 
order to gather suggestions for reform.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See for example, W Brueggemann ‘An Invitation to Justice’, November 2011, available at 
http://vimeo.com/17359821 accessed on 13 February 2014.  
4 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission (WCHC) Case Number: 8647/13  (‘HSF v 
JSC’ or ‘HSF Litigation’).  
5 See K Malleson ‘The Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in New 
Bottles?’ in Malleson and Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from Around the World (2006) 39. 
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The third and final Chapter is a platform for the ideas in Chapter I and Chapter 
II to coalesce. I argue that in order to transform the judiciary we must first transform: 
(i) a limited and out-dated conception of ‘superior courts’; (ii) the understanding of 
what tasks judges actually perform at the different levels of superior court 
adjudication; and (iii) finally, our understanding of ‘merit’. An important finding here is 
the emergence of what I call ‘constitutional imagination’, the ability to give expression 
to the Constitution and its vision for society.  I use this, and other findings, to provide 
new draft criteria for the Judicial Service Commission (‘JSC’) to consider when 
























CHAPTER I: WHAT IS IT THAT JUDGES DO? 
I Adjudication  
 
Among my favorite leisurely activities is watching soccer. One of the aspects of 
the game that I find most intriguing is the people selected to supervise games. 
Football referees enjoy full authority to enforce the laws under which the participants 
choose to play and their decisions are unappealable, except in exceptional 
circumstances. Traditionally, referees were amateurs. But today of course, as with the 
commercialisation of most sports, it is increasingly becoming a profession in its own 
right. Because of the difficulty of the task and the pressure involved in adjudicating in 
front of an unforgivable jury, referees are commonly abetted by two assistant referees, 
formerly known as linesmen, and in some matches, also by a fourth official.  
 
Interestingly, referees in the main, are not chosen from the ranks of 
footballers.6 It does not follow, in this regard, that because you are fast, or skillful, or 
because you can pass and dribble, score goals or defend them, you will make a good 
referee. Putting aside for the moment, that the position of referee might be 
unattractive to high-profile sportsmen and women, the most obvious reason might be 
that they involve different skills. 
 
Being a referee although requiring an understanding of the game, entails a 
different set of skills.7 Their main duty is to control the match in co-operation with the 
assistant referees and, where applicable, with the fourth official.8 Good referees 
understand how to adjudicate fouls, appreciate the rhythm of games, the nature of big 
derbies, how to control flaring tempers, tolerate petty tackles, and maintain the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 J Ashdown and P Bandini ‘Have any former professional footballers become referees?’ 31 March 
2010, available at http://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/mar/31/have-former-footballers-become-
referees accessed on 13 February 2014. 
7 The referee's powers and duties are described by the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (‘FIFA’) in a manual called, ‘The Laws of the Game’ (2011), available at 
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/81/42/36/lawsofthegame_2011_12_en.pdflast 
accessed on 6 February 2014. Their main powers include stopping, suspending or terminating the 
game for any infringements of ‘the Laws’, which includes taking disciplinary action. 
8 Id at 25.  
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respect and authority of the players, so that the contest does not descend into a free 
for all.9  
 
Extending this analogy to the courtroom, why is it then, that judges traditionally 
have been selected from the ranks of advocates? Is it fair to assume, that because 
one is familiar with the processes of formulating (culturally) persuasive legal argument, 
or carving out a client’s case within a set of accepted rules of principles, that you 
might a priori have learnt something about settling disputes? What is the ‘skill’, or 
skills of administering justice? How does one best qualify to be capable of deciding 
between two competing claims of right, or the provenance of fault, or just and 
equitable remedies, or as will become evident in this essay, solving problems of a 
socio-political and legal nature. The Constitution places a very exacting set of 
demands on those bestowed with the privilege of adjudication: it is a document 
orientated towards achieving social transformation; that is challenging established 
power structures in order to create a more free, equal and democratic society.10 Are 
advocates, and increasingly lawyers and academics, best placed to undertake the 
mammoth task of interrogating and reconstructing the common and customary law of 
this country? Why is it, that soccer players never become referees?  
 
It is natural to think of adjudication as a means of settling disputes and 
controversies.11 According to Fuller, adjudication, in its most traditional form, is a 
device, which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned 
argument in human affairs.12 That is, it is a form of social ordering institutionally 
committed to ‘rational’ decision-making by an impartial judge, who is open to 
persuasion by legal proofs. Judges here, exercise their skills in empirical fact-finding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Assistant referees, have a very specific and unforgiving jurisdiction: deciding whether players are off-
sides. 
10 ‘The commitment…to transform society… lies at the heart of our new constitutional order’ 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). See also P Langa 
‘Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review  3 at 4. See Generally D Davis 
& C Klare ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law’ (2010) 26 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 403 at 437.  
11 L Fuller ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353 at 357 (‘Forms 
and Limits’). 
12 Id at 366. 
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and logical reasoning.13 This form of dispute resolution is what makes participation 
particularly unique in superior courts. What ever heightens the significance of this 
experience, ‘lifts the process of adjudication towards its optimum expression.’14  
 
Critical legal theory,15 building on the gains made by the Legal Realism 
Movement16 has no doubt provided powerful critiques of this standard view of the 
process of adjudication. My interest here, though, is not so much the extent to which 
these theories, and other critiques, revealed the pervasiveness of gaps, conflicts and 
ambiguities present in the law, as well as the indeterminacy of popular legal tools 
such as stare decisis and other accepted legal canons to solve them.17 Rather, my 
concern is why, despite the availability of such critiques, and the transformative 
mandate of the Constitution,18 traditional South African legal culture19 continues to 
treat the issue of who judges should be with pervasive formalism,20 as evidenced in 
the HSF litigation.  
 
Both the examples of football referees and judges cover the subject matter of 
adjudication in the broadest sense. But does the comparison of playing versus 
adjudicating football games, and the practice and adjudication of law, hold? If not, why 
so? Although the origins of Lon Fuller's discursive essay, The Forms and Limits  
emerged from a small philosophy group at Harvard in the late 1950s, the framework 
of his original inquiry remains helpful and I adopt it below.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Unlike elections and contracts, in which decisions are reached by votes or negotiation, Fuller’s whole 
analysis was derived ‘from one simple proposition’, namely, ‘that the distinguishing characteristic of 
adjudication lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the 
decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision.’ Id at 364. 
14 Id at 364.  
15 See especially R Unger The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983) and R Unger What Should 
Legal Analysis Become? (1996). 
16 See generally J Singer ‘Legal Realism Now’ (1988) 76 California LR 465 and D Kennedy ‘Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685. 
17 See Davis & Klare op cit note 10 at 437.  
18 Id at 13. 
19 I adopt what Davis & Klare at 406 call the characteristic legal values, habits of mind, repertoire of 
arguments and manners of expression. 
20 There is a complete absence of critical jurisprudence in this area constitutional reform. See Davis & 
Klare op cit note 10 at 408.  
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II Forms of adjudication  
	  
By speaking of the forms of adjudication, we can begin to trace the 
development of the ways in which adjudication is and, as will become clear, should be 
organised and conducted. For, it must follow, that in order to know who judges should 
be, we must first know what it is that they do.21 The forms of adjudication are therefore 
concerned with the ways in which it may be organised and conducted. Traditionally, 
the ‘purest’ forms are those that best guarantee the party’s participation in the 
decision by proofs and reasoned arguments. This concept still dominates mainstream 
legal thought, as the HSF argues, ‘the ultimate arbiters of disputes about 
constitutional values’ judges must be appropriately qualified, experienced, and 
technically able.22 That is to say, capable of reasoned and rational decision-making. 
Any mixed, parasitic, and perverted forms of adjudication, to borrow Fuller’s own 
words, must therefore, be adopted with caution.23 This apparent caution was based 
on the concern that a judge might be lured out of his or her role as the objective, 
impartial and removed adjudicator.  
 
But it is exactly these ‘perverted’ and ‘mixed’ forms of adjudication that hold 
such promise. The doomed consequences of Fuller’s approach might be easy to 
predict. For many South Africans the daily experience of living in a country that suffers 
from severe inequality, foreshadows the hunch that elevating and rationalising legal 
analysis in this strict way inevitably throws light upon its own limitations. This limitation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Not in a political or philosophical sense but a practical sense. What I hope becomes clear is how little 
we have been able to adapt in our understanding and engagement with making adjudication work: who 
should be entitled to perform the function of judicial officer; what are the array of skills present in the art 
and science of judging; what are the legal problems most in need of resolution; what are the obstacles 
to fair and equal access to courts; what class, social and racial prejudices continue to exist without 
complete or partial-justification; and how do we ensure adjudication creates spaces for the resolution of 
disputes that enables, in contradistinction to the past, the opportunity for citizens to live bigger and 
larger lives.  
22 Helen Suzman Foundation Press Statement ‘The JSC: Guarding the Gatekeepers’ 13 April 2013 
available at http://hsf.org.za/resource-centre/hsf-briefs/the-jsc-guarding-the-gatekeepers accessed on 5 
February 2014.  
23 Fuller op cit note 11 at 396, ‘[t]his is what I have called a “mixed” form of adjudication. In fact the 
device as I have stated it amounts to a mixture of adjudication and negotiation. All mixed forms have 
their dangers, and tripartite arbitration is no exception. The danger lies in the difficult role to be played 
by the flanking arbitrators. They can be neither wholly advocates nor wholly judges. They cannot 
perform their role adequately if they are view.’ 
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exists both as a form of legal and political practice. First through legal design – the 
inaccessible courtroom – and second, through discouragement; subduing the political 
imagination, which creates and enables alternative forms of citizen participation.24 The 
consequences of this political and legal limitation are always disastrous. It is no 
exaggeration that the vast majority of citizens increasingly cannot afford access to 
justice in superior courts.  
 
In order to bring the superior court system into sharper focus it is necessary to 
update of our conceptual understanding of the superior courts in line with recent 
legislative developments. Periodically reviewing these changes and their intended 
consequences will reveal the extent to which the courts have been able to adapt 
successfully as spaces for solving society’s problems. An important part of this 
process is identifying bottlenecks in adjudicative processes. Armed with this deeper 
analysis government and legal reform lawyers can more accurately and critically say 
this is who judges should be. 
Superior courts in South Africa  
 
Chapter 8 of the Constitution provides the blueprint for the administration of 
justice in South Africa. The courts are independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the rule of law.25 Judges are those adjudicators appointed to the 
following benches: the Constitutional Court (‘Constitutional Court’, or ‘CC’), the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (‘Supreme Court of Appeal’, or ‘SCA’) and the High Court of 
South Africa, including courts of a similar status of the High Court.26 The Constitution 
Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2013 (‘Amendment Act’) now amends section 166 of 
the Constitution – the ‘Judicial system’ – to read follows: 
 
‘The courts are - 
(a)     the Constitutional Court; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Unger, op cit note 15 at 105. 
25 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
26 Section 166(a)-(e) of the Constitution.  
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(b)     the Supreme Court of Appeal; 
(c)     the High Court of South Africa, and any high court of appeal that may be 
established by an Act of Parliament to hear appeals from any court of a status 
similar to the High Court of South Africa; 
[Para. (c) substituted by s. 2 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2013] 
(d)     the Magistrates’ Courts; and 
(e)     any other court established or recognised in terms of an Act of Parliament, 
including any court of a status similar to either the High Court of South Africa or 
the Magistrates’ Courts. 
[Para. (e) substituted by s. 2 of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2013]’ 
 
The purpose of the Amendment Act is to provide for a single High Court of 
South Africa, to enable the Constitutional Court to be the highest court in all matters, 
and to regulate the jurisdiction of the SCA.27 The Constitutional Court is now the 
highest court of the Republic and may decide, in addition to constitutional matters, 
any other matter on the grounds that the it raises, ‘an arguable point of law of general 
public importance which ought to be considered by that Court.’28  
 
The Amendment Act must be read with the Superior Courts Act.29 Published in 
late 2013, the two acts together consolidate and rationalise the legislative reform 
geared towards establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements of the 
Constitution pertaining to superior courts.30 There are further on-going legislative 
reforms geared towards strengthening the institutional arrangements relating to the 
judicial branch of the state, but they will not be discussed here.31 This entire process 
however, gives effect to item 16(6)(a) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution, which 
instructs that all courts, including their structure, composition, functioning and 
jurisdiction, must be rationalised with a view to establishing a judicial system suited to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Preamble to the Amendment Act. 
28 Section 3 of the Amendment Act, read with section 167 of the Constitution.  
29 10 of 2013.  
30 Section 2(1) of the Superior Courts Act. 
31 The Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act, 20 of 2008; South African Judicial Education 
Institute Act, 14 of 2008. 
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the requirements of the Constitution. All courts other than the Constitutional Court, the 
SCA and the divisions of the High Court of South Africa may decide any matter 
determined by an Act of Parliament, but a court of a status lower than a High Court of 
South Africa may not enquire into or rule on the constitutionality of any legislation or 
any conduct of the President.32 The Superior Courts Act therefore addresses 
administrative and procedural matters pertaining to superior courts, most of which are 
not relevant here.33 
 
The Constitutional Court is a single court without divisions, which sits in 
Braamfontein, Johannesburg. The CC comprises 11 judges, and any matter before 
the CC must be heard by at least eight judges.34 It is now the highest court in all 
matters and continues to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction in terms of section 172(4) of the 
Constitution.35 Application to the CC is made by way of notice of motion, supported by 
an affidavit. There are no witnesses and thus no oral evidence is admissible.36 It is a 
process based purely on the papers. Statistics for the financial year ending 2011/12 
reveal that the CC received 123 applications, dismissed 76 applications, and handed 
down 35 judgments.37 In the year ending 2011/2012 it had a budget of R90 993 000. 
Compare this to the SCA for same year period.  
 
As a general rule, the SCA sits in panels of five or three Judges, depending on 
the nature of the appeal.38 The SCA decides cases upon the record of the 
proceedings after considering the written and oral arguments presented.39  Witnesses 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Section 6 of the Amendment Act.  
33 Section 6 of the Superior Courts Act establishes nine divisions of the High Court of South Africa 
mirror the provincial delineation in the Constitution. 
34 Section 167(2) o f the Constitution read together with section 12 of the Superior Courts Act .  
35 The exclusive jurisdiction provisions under Section 167(4) of the Constitution remain unchanged. 
Further, the CC still makes the final decision on whether an Act of Parliament, a Provincial Act or the 
conduct of the President is constitutional. 
36 See ‘Rules of the Constitutional Court’, available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/rulesofthecourt.htm accessed on 31 January 2013. 
37 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Annual Report’ (2011/2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/report_list.html accessed on 5 February 2014 (‘Annual Report 
2011/2012’). 
38 See section 13 of the Superior Courts Act.  
39 See ‘About the SCA’, available at http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/aboutsca.htm, accessed on 10 
February 2014. 
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do not appear before the court, and the parties need not be present during the 
hearing of an appeal.40 The seat of the SCA is at Bloemfontein. The Supreme Court 
Act, and now the Superior Courts Act, makes provision for a session of the court to be 
conducted at another place by reason of exceptional circumstances, but this rarely 
happens.  
 
The SCA bench comprised 25 judges of appeal, including the Judge President 
and his Deputy in the year 2011.41 In the year ending 2011/12 the SCA saw 119 
criminal appeals enrolled and 83 were finalised; 222 new petitions were enrolled and 
189 finalised. Furthermore, 601 civil appeals were enrolled, and 259 were finalised, 
412 new petitions were enrolled and 427 were finalised.42 In the actual year of 2011, it 
handed down 249 judgments.  The budget for the SCA for the year ending 2011/2012 
was R20 800 000. Considering that the SCA is often the final arbiter of civil and 
criminal disputes, that is a remarkable output considering that it operates on a budget 
less than a quarter to that of the CC.43 
 
However, the jurisdiction of the SCA has not been left unharmed during the 
recent rationalising process. Generally, the SCA has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine an appeal against any decision of a high court as well as constitutional 
issues. But importantly, the Amendment Act has confined the jurisdiction of the SCA 
in one important way. The amendment of section 168(3)(a) of the Constitution now 
reads: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Id.  
41 I have used the figure provided in the Department of Government Communication and Information 
System ‘Pocket Guide to South Africa Yearbook’ (2011/2012) available at 
http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/resourcecentre/sa-info/pocket-guide-south-africa-20112012 accessed 
on 13 February 2014 (‘SA Yearbook 2011/2012’). I acknowledge that the composition might be slightly 
different at date of writing. For example currently the SCA comprises 22 judges, including the President 
and Judge President. See ‘Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal’, available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judges.html accessed on 13 February 2014. 
42 See also SA Yearbook 2012/2013 at 139. 
43 See also, Sammie Moshenberg ‘the United States Presentation to Paarl Judicial Selection Meeting’ 
(unpublished paper) 27 September 2013, ‘[T]he nine justices on the Supreme Court hear fewer than 
100 cases per year. The 13 federal Circuit Courts of Appeal hear about 60,000 cases per year and so 
are almost always the last word on important constitutional rights cases for the states that fall under 
their jurisdiction. The 94 federal District Courts hear hundreds of thousands of cases. As with the 




‘The Supreme Court of Appeal may decide appeals in any matter arising from the High 
 Court of South Africa or a court of a similar status similar to the High Court of South 
 Africa, except in respect of labour or competition matters to such an extent as my be 
 determined by an Act of Parliament.’ (my emphasis)  
 
This is an interesting diminution in jurisdiction that no doubt takes notice of the 
developments in superior court practice over the last two decades. The Renaming of 
High Courts Act, 30 of 2008 lists the 13 high courts in South Africa. There are two 
more high courts projected for completion: the Limpopo High Court in 2014, and the 
Mpumalanga High Court in 2016.44 Currently, Mpumalanga, a province of 4 039 939 
million (7.8 percent of the population), does not have a high court. In 2011/12, high 
courts enrolled 27 804 new civil matters for trial and finalised 28 886 (which included 
settlements and withdrawals) and 49 868 default judgment applications.45 The high 
courts received 104 884 new motion applications and finalised 82 431 matters. In 
2011/12, the high courts received 902 first-appearance criminal matters and finalised 
1 130 cases. The budget for the year ending 2011/2012 was R353 832 000, about 
four times that of the Constitutional Court. This of course says nothing about 
magistrates’ courts, where ordinary people encounter the law. Because the focus of 
this paper is on superior courts, I will not address this structure.   
 
 The court structure outlined here presents an introduction into traditional forms 
of superior court adjudication. But this is an inaccurate and uncritical reflection of 
superior court work. The Constitution demands a vigorous inquiry into the relationship 
between the exercise of power, and the procedural framework by which such power 
dynamics are maintained. To this end, it set up special courts on equal footing to the 
high courts that would target focal areas of inequality: competition practices, land 
reform, and labour practices.46 It seems that, generally, it would be fair to claim that 
the South African legal community is yet to grasp the importance and magnitude of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Annual Report’ (2012/13), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/reportfiles/report_list.html accessed on 5 February 2014 (‘Annual Report 
2012/2013’) at 75. 
45 Annual Report 2011/2012 op cit note 37 at 20 and Annual Report 2012/2013 id at 24.  
46 The Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court; The Land Claims Court; The Competition Appeal Court; 
The Electoral Court; and The Tax Court. 
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the body of work these courts produce. Perhaps this is because the introduction of 
specialised courts is still relatively new and their impact has yet to be fully digested. 
But the combined effect of their contributions towards the efficient administration of 
justice can no longer be ignored; in pure financial terms, their budget alone for the 
year ending 2011/2012 was more than twice that of the SCA, at R41 516 000,47 and 
their workload challenges the high courts as the busiest spaces for adjudication in 
South Africa.  
 
 The next section will take a closer look at two specialised courts – those that 
the SCA no longer has appellate jurisdiction over – and the design of their 
adjudicative systems. The purpose of this being to draw attention to the potential of 
these powerful alternative forms of adjudication, which provide a persuasive basis to 
challenge basic, but deep-seated assumptions about how we think about judges, what 
they do, and where they work.  
Specialised courts 
 
 The first is the Competition Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) and the Competition Appeals 
Court (‘CAC’). The Tribunal adjudicates competition matters and has jurisdiction 
throughout South Africa and is independent and subject to the Constitution and the 
rule of law. The powers of the Tribunal are quite simply awesome, and they reflect the 
commitment of South Africa’s first democratic government to strengthen the 
competition regime in the context of the country’s highly concentrated economy.48  
 
The Competition Act originally provided that the CAC was the final court on all 
competition issues other than those that raised a constitutional issue. However, The 
Supreme Court of Appeal found in the American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and 
Another v Competition Commission of South Africa (‘ANSAC’) that under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Annual Report 2011/2012 op cite note 37 at 58.  
48 The Competition Act, 89 of 1998 (‘Competition Act’). See also, Competition Tribunal Report, 
‘Unleashing the Rivalry: Ten Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities’ 
(2009) at 1, available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Reports/unleashing-rivalry.pdf 
accessed on 3 February 2014 (‘Unleashing the Rivalry’). Also, importantly, this is one area where the 
SCA and CC’s record his been mixed: See generally, Davis & Klare op cit note 10. 
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Constitution, the CAC could not be a final court of appeal and that, even in non-
constitutional matters, appeals could still be made to the SCA:49  
 
 ‘In accordance with the Act’s own injunction, it must be interpreted 
 consistently with the Constitution. In accordance with sound 
 constitutional hermeneutics, its provisions should if possible be interpreted so 
 as not to render them unconstitutional.’50 (My emphasis.) 
 
 
Reasoning for this judgment was based on National Union of Metalworkers of 
South Africa and Others v Fry's Metals (Pty) Ltd51 where the Supreme Court held that 
the Constitution vests the SCA with power to hear appeals from the Labour Appeal 
Court (‘LAC’) in both constitutional and non-constitutional matters, and that the 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act52 (‘LRA’) that confer final appellate power on 
the LAC must be read subject to the appellate hierarchy created by the Constitution 
itself.53 This appeal process, however, is patently illogical. For example, the high 
profile Senwes matter originally proceeded from the Competition Tribunal54 where 
argument was first heard in November 2007, then proceeded on appeal to the CAC,55 
then to the SCA,56 and finally to the Constitutional Court for a decision in April 2012, 
some five years later. The late Lord Chief Justice Bingham set out seven criteria by 
which a legal system should be assessed.57 One of the core tenets was that means 
must be provided for resolving bona fide civil disputes without prohibitive cost or delay. 
An appeal structure as cumbersome and as costly as this clearly flouts this basic 
requirement.  
 
 Fortunately this situation will now be changed with the introduction of the 
Superior Courts Act. The CAC will now finally enjoy authority in relation to competition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 (2005) 3 All SA 1 (SCA). 
50 Id at 13. 
51 2005 (3) All SA 318 (SCA). 
52 66 of 1995. 
53 ANSAC supra note 49 at 13-14. 
54 Competition Tribunal found that Senwes had contravened section 8(c) of the Competition Act, 89 of 
1998 (‘Competition Act’) in the Competition Commission vs Senwes Limited (2009) 1 CPLR 18 (CT). 
55 Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission of South Africa (2009) 2 CPLR 304 (CAC). 
56 Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission (2011) 1 CPLR 1 (SCA). 
57 Tom Bingham The Rule of Law (2010). 
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matters, subject to appeals to the Constitutional Court when in the public interest. I 
mention this in such detail because it points to a problem with the common belief, and 
indeed, comfort found in legal assurance, that a court like the SCA might be more 
competent than a ‘lower court’; even over an sepecialised appeal court exercising its 
own jurisdiction. What it does do, if anything, is prove that judges in an appeal court 
like the SCA do not so much exercise expert legal knowledge, but rather their generic 
ability to assimilate information quickly, apply facts to the law, and interrogate 
technical problems, which entail very complicated non-legal socio-economic issues.   
 
 But the Amendment Act has a second important consequence: that we ought 
to give more credence to the Tribunal as an adjudicative body. Although the rules of 
procedure and evidence at the Tribunal are less stringent than the Uniform Rules of 
Court, should these Tribunal ‘members’ not be considered to perform the kind of work 
that judges do?58 Institutionally, the Tribunal is equal to the high courts; its 
independence is guaranteed in the same way;59 and, the matters before the Tribunal 
entail complex questions of law and evidence. If so, does this not challenge 
profoundly what we readily accept as, ‘judge’ and how they ought to function?60 
 
To this end, notwithstanding the complexity of the adjudicative role and the 
powerful influence of the companies and industries that appear before them, the 
Tribunal’s membership – or composition of ‘judges’ – is mixed. In terms of section 28 
of the Competition Act, the Tribunal must collectively represent a broad cross-section 
of the population of the Republic and ‘comprise sufficient persons with legal 
training.’61 Each individual member of the Tribunal must, however, have suitable 
qualifications and experience in ‘economics, law, commerce, industry or public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 See Competition Tribunal ‘Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Tribunal’ 
(Effective from 1 February 2001) available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/the-act/tribunal-rules-and-
flowcharts/ accessed on 13 February 2014.  
59 See sections 20 and 28 of the Competition Act. 
60 See The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcements Act, 2007 as well as LJ Carnwarth ‘Tribunals and the 
Courts – the UK Model’ (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice 5. See also, 
‘Basic Principles of the Judiciary endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985’ available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx accessed on 14 
February 2014.  
61 ‘Qualifications of members of Competition Tribunal’, set out in section 28(1) of the Competition Act. 
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affairs.’62 The complicated nature of competition law no doubt influenced this decision, 
and the Tribunal currently consists of lawyers, academics and those that specialise in 
commercial and economic matters, some full-time and others part-time.63 This 
innovative mix of lawyers and other skilled professionals seems not to have impacted 
the imagination of the JSC and other legal reform advocates, especially in the context 
of transformation. Indeed, the JSC took the view that appointing lay economists to an 
appeal court bench was not constitutional.64 This is despite the fact that when the 
Competition Act was first passed in 1998, the Court was originally conceived to be 
made up of a bench of three high court judges and two further members who would 
be appointed because of their expertise in the field of economics.65 
 
Although these two points about jurisdiction and composition may seem 
cursory, they point to something more fundamental: a possible recipe for rethinking 
adjudication in South Africa, in line with the constitutional mandate for 
transformation.66  
 
In order to bolster this proposition, I will show that the potential in competition 
law regulation is not isolated. A second example is made by way of the LRA. The 
drafters of the LRA were acutely aware of the historical inequality in the labour market 
when it designed the adjudicative system for labour relations in South Africa. At the 
core of the provisions was an intention to create a legislative system that would 
advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation 
of the workplace, which included taking on private power.67 Section 167(1) establishes 
the Labour Appeal Court (‘LAC’) as a court of law and equity. In doing so, it created 
two new institutions for dispute resolution and adjudication: the Commission for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Section 28(2)(b) of the Competition Act. 
63‘Competition Tribunal Membership’ available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/about/members/ accessed 
on 13 February 2014. 
64 Id.  
65 Unleashing the Rivalry op cit note 48 at 5.  
66 Preamble to Competition Act, ‘That apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices of the past 
resulted in excessive concentrations of ownership and control within the national economy, inadequate 
restraints against anti- competitive trade practices, and unjust restrictions on full and free participation 
in the economy by all South Africans.’ 
67 Section 1 of the LRA.  
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Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (‘CCMA’) and a specialist system of labour 
courts with an exclusive labour law jurisdiction.68  
 
 The establishment of the CCMA as the entity responsible for dispute resolution 
in certain categories of disputes, which includes ‘rights’ disputes that may be referred 
to arbitration or adjudication, was an important and innovative reform that made 
adjudication in this field far simpler, more accessible and quicker. The CCMA is 
subject to the oversight of the Labour Court (LC) and the LAC, where unresolved 
rights disputes can be referred either to arbitration or to adjudication by the LC. The 
LC and LAC were thus created to operate as superior courts, with exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide matters arising from the LRA. According to the South Africa Year 
Book, the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court received 11 235 new cases in the 
2011/12 financial year and finalised 6553 matters.69 The Superior Court Act now 
cements the LAC as the final arbiter of disputes, subject to an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
 Not only does this position, like with the Tribunal, add credence to the LC and 
the LAC, but to think of the LC and the LAC without the CCMA is not only 
disingenuous, but legally dishonest. These trials are nothing more than an appeal 
from a mediation process. The whole point of the CCMA was to resolve disputes by 
conciliation so as to reduce the incidence of industrial action and litigation.70 Indeed, 
although special labour courts evidently perform important oversight functions, their 
workload pales in comparison to the engine room of the CCMA. Referrals to the 
CCMA, for the year ending 2011/2012 consisted of a phenomenal 161 674 cases. Of 
that number, the CCMA’s caseload for arbitration has been fairly large ranging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 There are two important decisions that relate to this issue. The first is Chirwa v Transnet Limited 
2008 (4) SA 367 (CC) (‘Chirwa’) and the second is Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) 
SA 238 (CC) (‘Gcaba’). In terms of the former, the majority of the court decided that the Constitution 
must be interpreted to draw a distinction between constitutional rights to administrative justice and to 
fair labour practices. In Gcaba, Van der Westhuizen J adopted a purposive reading of s 157 of the 
LRA, affirming the finding in Chirwa and holding that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
labour matters. 
69 Annual Report 2011/2012 op cit note 37 at 20.  
70 The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Labour Relations Act (LRA). 
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between 38,319 (2007/8) and 49,799 (2010/2011).71 Again, the structure of the 
arbitration process seeks to, ‘ensure that arbitration hearings are conducted more 
swiftly than conventional litigation and in accordance with the goal of providing dispute 
resolution that is “simple, quick, cheap and non-legalistic”’. And by all accounts, it has 
achieved this goal.72  
 
 Although the tasks, processes and powers of each forum – the CCMA and the 
LC and LAC – are no doubt different, the nuances of which will not be traced here, 
their functions are concerned with the same body of work. And yet inherent prejudices 
or perhaps a lack of imagination within South Africa’s legal culture insists that there is 
something more special about the judicial task performed at the LC and the LAC, 
when in fact the only legitimate difference is that those at the LC and the LAC perform 
the same task better, ostensibly because of their skill and/or experience. Any doubt 
about this proposition is quashed by the LRA itself, which specifies that LC judges 
themselves need not be judges of the High Court – although they must be legal 
practitioners - and are subject to a different appointments procedure.73 
 
What this insidious adjudicative inequality reveals, in ways we normally do not 
even realise, is that adjudication when humanising private power is less praiseworthy 
than run-of the-mill civil work, where private power, uses courtrooms to enforce its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 P Benjamin ‘Assessing South Africa’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA)’ (2013) International Labour Office Working Paper No. 47 at 19.  
72 ‘When compared to conventional courts, whether civil courts with general jurisdiction or specialised 
labour courts, the CCMA has proved highly successful. Specifically, it has succeeded in providing 
enhanced and expedited access to dispute resolution to employees who generally would not otherwise 
have had the resources to bring legal challenges against decisions by their employers in conventional 
litigation proceedings. Id at 45.  
73 See Section 153 of the LRA.  In terms of the LRA, the President, acting on the advice of National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (‘NEDLAC’) and the JSC, must appoint judges to the 
Labour Court who are either a judge of the High Court; or a person who is a legal practitioner and has 
knowledge, experience and expertise in labour law. However, The Judge President and the Deputy 
Judge President of the Labour Court must be both judges of superior courts and must have knowledge, 
experience and expertise in labour law. See section 153(2) of the LRA. This appointment procedure, 
which involves NEDLAC, plays a significant role in the appointment of Labour Court judges, enabling 
the social partners to play an active role in determining the composition of the Court. See further, 
152(1)(c) of the LRA. 
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various contracts, claims against government and collect money.74 There are no local 
studies of the true costs of the civil litigation system in South Africa, but research in 
the United States shows unequivocally that although state civil justice systems play 
an indispensable role by serving as the primary forum in which disputes can be 
resolved, ‘state civil justice systems create huge costs, many previously unexamined, 
that burden [the] state and national economies.’75 
 
But there is a deeper anomaly. Precisely because it involves humanising 
corporate power rather than enabling the status quo, we do not associate this type of 
adjudication with judge work. The caution, or danger that Fuller warned against, which 
was the encroachment of functions such as negotiation, bargaining, and generally the 
work that involves reimagining legal solutions is the very stuff of transformative 
constitutionalism. Why, then, is there a fear of the legal imagination to embrace more 
constructive and reconstructive practices of legal analysis and by implication, legal 
practices? In terms of section 34 of the Constitution, everyone has the right to have 
any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum. 
 
The popular conceptions of judges as legislators, most famously captured by 
the conception of Dworkin’s Hercules J,76 although less prominent and more 
sophisticated, still holds powerful sway over popular conceptions about who judges 
should be. Indeed, imagination around alternative legal institutions demands, urgently, 
new possibilities, and a renewed discourse around which we can energise and 
organise for more just administration processes. Central to this process is to gather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 The assertion is based on my studies of the High Court Rolls in the Western Cape for the year 2011. 
There are however comparative studies, which corroborate my findings. See for example, LJ McQuillan 
et al ‘Jackpot Justice: The True Cost of America’s Tort System’ (2007) and for a general discussion see 
N Ferguson ‘The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and Economics Die’ (2012).  
75 Jackotpot Justice op cit note 74 at vi.  
76 I am not distinguishing between hard cases, or different types of judicial review, as Jeremy Waldron 
discusses in, J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 
1346 at 1353 ‘This is an Essay about judicial review of legislation, not judicial review of executive 
action or administrative decision making’. The conception of Hercules J was introduced in R Dworkin 
‘Hard Cases’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1057.  
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data on what courts adjudicate in order to more critically understand judge work. 
These processes have commenced,77 but have yet to be drawn together in a pattern 
of consistency that makes the vision of alternative adjudicative both possible and 
exciting. And so, the combined work in the fields of competition and labour law not 
only provide invaluable lessons, but provide evidence for a strategy to 
reconceptualise who judges actually are, what they do, and where our judges work.   
III The limits of adjudication  
Introduction 
 
In the previous section I began to outline that at least in two important areas of 
South African legal practice, and in not inconsequential ways, judges – or members of 
alternative adjudicative models – successfully operate under a ‘perverted’ form of 
adjudication. Indeed, they have used the social justice mandate that underpins the 
Constitution, emboldened by their institutional design, to radically tackle the issues of 
work and economic life. But, even the divisions of the High Court of South Africa, the 
SCA and the CC – more traditional forums of adjudication – judges do not only 
confine themselves to adjudicating between competing claims of right, or the 
provenance of fault; they deal with the kind of issues Fuller would regard as tasks 
inherently unsuited to adjudication.78 South African judges solve, regularly, problems 
of a socio-political and legal nature entailing complicated polycentric issues framed by 
our past. Their responses overtly revealing attitudes towards separation of powers 
theory, legal theory and the like, but also sub-conscious prejudices towards race, 
class and gender equality. Whatever the political, legal and personal constraints 
operating on the judiciary, it has a mandate to make available, practically and 
imaginatively, the space in which the real work of social reform can occur.79 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 See for M Wesson & M du Plessis, ‘The Transformation of the Judiciary’ (Fifteen Year Policy Review, 
South African Presidency; available at 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/reports/15year_review/jcps/transformation_judiciary.pdf 
accessed on 13 February 2014, and also the Legal Practice Bill [B 20—2012] GN 35357 of 15 May 
2012. 
78 Fuller op cit note 11 at 393.  
79 See Unger What Should Legal Analysis Become? op cit note 15.  
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By speaking of the limits of adjudication,80 we are here able to identify what 
kinds of social interactions should properly be assigned to certain adjudicative forums. 
One way to understand this problem is by triage: a medical process of determining the 
priority of a patient’s treatments based on their severity of their condition. Victor 
Flango and Thomas Clarke address this concept by simply asking which disputes 
belong in court, in an essay of the same name.81 This is a process of rationing 
treatment efficiently and fairly when resources – public and private – are both 
insufficient and largely unequal. The authors argue that uncontested issues and 
issues not adversarial do not require adjudicatory processes even though they remain 
under court jurisdiction. For example, much trial work has shifted from dispute 
resolution to routine administration, and that many issues do not involve cases of 
controversy.82  
 
Triage is necessary to match the right issues with the right adjudicatory 
processes.83 The first step is a screening process. A major component of this work is 
to identify which disputes truly belong in a full adversary process of adjudication, 
because, as Robert Tobin remarks, [t]he relatively inflexible and formal nature of the 
adversarial system does not suit most disputes’.84 Types of cases that are well suited 
to adjudication include: cases raising constitutional issues or conflict-of-law issues; 
criminal cases where death penalty, life sentence, or other significant loss of liberty is 
a potential outcome; and civil cases (contract or delict) with high stakes. Here the 
most important judicial skill is assessing proofs and arguments, developing the law 
and providing reasoned analysis. 
 
If the stakes are not high enough, or the time and costs involved in the 
adversary process seem inadequate, some legal leaders suggest a more cooperative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This practical question addresses an aspect of adjudication that Lon Fuller's idealistic essay could 
not possibly have conceived of: how, in a deeply unequal world, where litigants cannot access proper 
representation, where the queue for the court is long and arduous, where almost all issues are 
polycentric, do we best settle disputes and controversies. 
81 V Flango & T Clarke ‘Which Disputes Belong in Court?’ (2011) 50 Judges Journal 22. 
82 Id at 23. 
83 Id. 
84 R Tobin Creating the judicial Branch: The Unfinished Reform (1999) quoted in Vlango & Clarke id.  
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approach, ‘[m]ore and more judicial experts recognize the inadequacy of the win/lose 
system of traditional courts for dispute resolution. A system of mediation/arbitration 
could let all parties be winners, or at least have their interests be considered promptly 
and fairly.’85 Types of cases that are well suited to this type of adjudication include: 
divorce proceedings with issues of custody, child support, abuse or neglect; mental 
health and drug cases; and, crimes involving juveniles. Disposition of the case does 
not depend on applying the facts to the law, but rather, ‘diagnostic adjudication’, 
where judges must fashion appropriate remedies. Here the most important judicial 
skill is a sense of equity and justice.  
 
Alternatively, cases that are likely to benefit from a modified adversarial 
process may be the following: cases likely to raise constitutional issues; criminal 
cases involving loss of liberty, but less so than more serious crimes; civil cases with 
moderate stakes; and, public interest cases.86 The suggestion here is that many 
cases in the courts today are not conflicts at all, and cases that are not in dispute or 
not having two sides ought to be screened out of the adjudication process. In the 
words of a former federal judge, ‘the courts are being asked to solve problems for 
which they are not institutionally equipped or not as well equipped as other available 
agencies’.87 So triage is about using judge time efficiently, setting up specialist 
tribunals88 to deal with particular types of disputes, critically assessing the nature of 
common disputes whether criminal or civil, creating spaces for solving legal problems 
and most of all bettering the system of administrative justice. Given the sheer 
immensity required for transformation, are we asking too much of our judges?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 G Stephens ‘Participatory Justice’ in Edward Cornish (ed) The 1990s & Beyond (1990) 100 quoted in 
Vlango & Clarke op cit note 81 at 25.  
86  Vlango & Clarke op cit note 81 at 27.  
87 S Rifkind ‘Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts’ (1976) 70 FRD 96 at 97 quoted in Vlango & 
Clarke op cit note 81 at 23. 
88 For example, magistrate’s courts should be empowered to deal with administrative issues under the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’) in line with the provisions under the 
definition of ‘Court’. See LJ Carnwarth op cit note 60 at 5-10; R Creyke 'Administrative Justice: beyond 
the Courtroom Door’ 2006 Acta Juridica 257; C Saunders 'Apples, oranges and comparative 





So what are the limits and constraints of the current forms of adjudication in 
South Africa? South Africa ranks as one of the most unequal countries in the world.89 
The unemployment rate, including discouraged workers is estimated to be as high as 
36.8 percent in 2013.90  With a total population of R52.98 million in 2012, that 
amounts to just under 20 million individuals. We are a country that cannot afford to 
save – the savings-to-disposable-income ratio of households in the latest study by the 
Institute for Race Relations was zero percent.91 In 2012, the ratio of household debt to 
disposable income was high as 75 percent.92 Certainly there are few precedents for 
this kind of debt around the world.93  
 
The costs of high court litigation are therefore often affordable. In the recent 
decision of Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and Another v 
Harrison and Another94 the CC expressed its disquiet at counsel’s fees which have 
burgeoned in recent years, ‘[t]o say that they have skyrocketed is no loose 
metaphor’.95 The reality of course, is that poor and middle class96 people do not 
litigate in superior courts. Corporations and wealthy individuals do. But to this end, we 
are yet to develop a discourse that more accurately assesses what they are litigating. 
Most court analysis over the past 15 years has focused on the CC,97 as the CC is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 South Africa currently has a Gini coefficient of 0.63. See World Bank data available here 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa accessed on 13 February 2014.  
90 J Kane-Berman (eds) (2012) ‘Fast Facts’ (South African Institute of Race Relations) at 28 (‘Fast 
Facts’).  
91 Id at 5. 
92 Id. 
93 Ferguson op cit note 74 at 2. 
94 2012 (11) BCLR 1143 (CC). 
95 Id at 10, ‘No matter the complexity of the issues, we can find no justification, in a country where 
disparities are gross and poverty is rife, to countenance appellate advocates charging hundreds of 
thousands of rands to argue an appeal.’ 
96 The middle group in South Africa, comprising 4.2 million households, is quite poor, receiving 
between R1,520 and R4,560 as their total household income per month for a household of four in 
2008. See J Visagie ‘Who are the middle class in South Africa? Does it matter for policy?’ 29 April 2013 
available at 
http://www.econ3x3.org/article/who-are-middle-class-south-africa-does-it-matter-
policy#sthash.bHx4Nkhr.dpuf accessed on 13 Februay 2014.  
97 Fore example, Wesson & du Plessis op cit note 77. 
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final arbiter of constitutional issues. But to focus on the CC at the expense of a 
complimentary analysis of SCA and high court jurisprudence means that we have a 
very limited conceptual base to claim what our courts are doing as a superior court 
bench. More than anything however, it is an indictment on the profession’s class bias.  
 
An assessment of the weekly roll at the Western Cape High Court for the year 
2011, for example,98 reveals that the following matters occur frequently: sequestration 
and insolvency matters; default judgment and summary judgment applications for 
monies owing to large banks; divorce proceedings; and of course, civil and criminal 
trials. This is a direct reaction to the national and global economic down-turn 
precipitated by the Great Recession in 2009, from which South Africa, like many 
countries, continues to suffer.99 The origins of the financial crisis has a serious and 
complicated history, but involves in no small part the reckless lending of large public 
banks all over the Western world, including investment banks.100 The economic 
impact of the recession on our adjudication processes receives almost zero attention. 
Do most of these cases require the full protection of the full adversarial system?  
 
Generally, the SCA is a forum well suited to ‘pure’ adjudication. There are no 
witnesses, argument is on paper delivered by experienced counsel and judges 
develop the law in high profile cases. Or so we think. In the year 2011, the largest 
area of law within the 249 judgments handed down was not delict, commercial or 
contract law: it was criminal law.101 That is a very peculiar fact. Instinctively we tend to 
assume that the SCA does, in the main, deal with commercial, delict and contractual 
issues more often than not. It is a peculiar fact because regional magistrates’ courts 
have jurisdiction to deal with serious criminal offenses, and yet our most skilled jurists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Available at http://www.westerncape.gov.za/sites/www.westerncape.gov.za/files/court-roll-thursday-
19-september-2013.pdf accessed on 14 February 2014.  
99 See Joseph Stiglitz The Price of Inequality (2012).  
100 Which coincided with legislation passed by Congress designed to increase the percentage of low-
income families to own their homes through government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. See Ferguson op cit note 74 at 56-7. 
101 Judgements available for the year 2011 are available at www.saflii.org accessed on 13 February 
2014.  
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are overseeing their appeals, with no small measure of infrequency.102 Although the 
SCA of course dealt with commercial, delictual and contractual issues, it also dealt 
with the following areas of law in some consistency: property, administrative law and 
procedure related issues.103  
 
Compare this to the 37 cases handed down by the 11 justices of the 
Constitutional Court in 2011. Although the judgment rate of the CC is significantly less 
than the SCA, the decisions of that year affected a wide range of important issues 
relating to public life. The CC determined that the provisional sentence procedure set 
out in Rule 8 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court was unconstitutional;104 it 
revolutionised mineworkers’ compensation in Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd;105 it 
held, on a close 5-4 split that the Constitution's scheme, taken as a whole, imposes a 
duty on the state to set up a concrete, effective and independent mechanism to 
prevent and root out corruption in Glenister;106 and, interestingly, just under two 
percent of its judgments that year involved cases relating to evictions, which allowed 
the court to continue its progressive pro-poor jurisprudence.107 But an even more 
interesting fact is that the CC overturned the SCA’s judgments in no less than five 
important decisions: the SCA not affording a petitioner for leave to appeal a fair 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Annual Report 2011/2012 op cit note 37 at 37. See section 89(2) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 32 
of 1944 ‘the court of a regional division shall have jurisdiction over all offences except treason’. 
103 I analysed the decisions of 2011 and broke them down into key legal issues and the following areas 
of law were prominent.  
104 Tweejonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa t/a The 
Land Bank 2011 (3) SA 1 (CC).  
105 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC). When the Court assessed the constitutionality of the compensatory schemes 
for employees suffering diseases at work under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act (COIDA), on the one hand, and Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works  Act  
(ODIMWA), and found not only that the Supreme Court of Appeal erred, but that they could enforce 
their common law right compensation.  
106 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
107 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thebelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC); 
Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC); Hajfejee 
N.O v eThekwini Municipality 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blue Moonlight Properties 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC); Pheko v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 2012 
(2) SA 598 (CC); Occupiers of Portion R25 of the Farm Mooiplaats 355JR v Golden Thread Limited 
2012 (2) SA 337 (CC); Occupiers of Skurweplaas 353 JR v PPC Aggregate Quarries (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2012 (4) BCLR 382 (CC).  
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trial;108 changing the way lawyers think about the common law and mineworker 
compensation;109 protecting the right to freedom of expression;110 access to 
confidential information held by the state;111 and delict.112  
 
The last instance, which held that the Minister for Safety and Security was 
vicariously liable for the assault and rape of a young woman by a policeman who was 
on ‘standby duty’, is yet another example of post-apartheid jurisprudence embarking 
on a new and complicated trajectory. Francios Du Bois’s article State Liability in South 
Africa: A constitutional remix, in which he analyses government’s special duty to 
protect the public, argues convincingly that over the past 15 years, South African law 
has loosened its close historical ties in this field to the common-law family of legal 
systems.113 Today, ‘its willingness to provide remedies in delict for omissions on the 
part of public officials and institutions, especially when they have breached duties 
arising from fundamental rights, contrasts sharply with English law….’.114 This is 
interesting because although judges in South Africa use the same ‘conceptual 
apparatus’ as their common law counterparts, ‘they come to very different 
conclusions.’115  
 
This is not of course to suggest simply that the SCA has struggled to grasp the 
implications of the transformative mandate of the Constitution when developing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Qhinga and Others v State 2011 (9) BCLR (CC). The applicants were convicted of attempted 
murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances solely on the basis of statements and pointings-
out as evidence after trials-within-the-trial were conducted. The trial proceedings had not been 
forwarded to the SCA, nor had they had sight of the record. The applicants argued that the SCA could 
not have considered its application without that information. The Constitutional Court agreed. 
109 Mankayi v AngloGold Ashanti Ltd supra note 105.  
110 Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC). 
111 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Limited 2012 (2) SA 50 (CC). 
The matter stems from a request by the publisher of the Mail and Guardian newspaper, brought under 
the Promotion of Access to Information Act, that the President make public a report drafted by two 
South African judges on the 2002 presidential elections in Zimbabwe.  
112 F v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC). The case involved a 
successful application for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, which 
held that the Minister of Safety and Security was not vicariously liable for the assault and rape of a 
young girl by a policeman who was on ‘standby duty’. The Court overturned this decision.  
113 F Du Bois ‘State Liability in South Africa: A constitutional remix’ (2010) 25 Tul. Eur. & Civ. LF 139. 
114 Id at 1.  
115 Id at 4.  
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common law in major cases. The Constitutional Court too, as Davis and Klare point 
out evidences a more complicated and ambiguous story.116 The CC has for example 
sometimes missed out on pushing the ‘transformative envelope’, most notably on 
questions of economic distribution.117 The difficulty was well summed up by Justice 
Sachs in Prince v the President of the Cape Law Society and Others:118 
 
 ‘The search for an appropriate accommodation in this frontier legal 
 territory accordingly imposes a particularly heavy responsibility on the 
 courts to be sensitive to considerations of institutional competence and the 
 separation of powers. Undue judicial adventurism can be as damaging as 
 excessive judicial timidity.’ 
 
The result is a mixed array of approaches that often tend to sway between two 
polar opposites: a traditional approach and a transformative approach, which 
illustrates the complexity of the task of transformative constitutionalism.119  
IV Conclusion  
 
The point of this first chapter was to expose the fault lines in three important 
ways: how we think about adjudication; the forms of adjudication; and the limits of 
adjudication as spaces for solving legal problems. The fields of labour and 
competition law provide important lessons because they challenge traditional notions 
of how to adjudicate, where to adjudicate and who should adjudicate. As models for 
dealing with and responding to the inequality in these fields, they provide inspiration 
for superior court reform, especially when thinking about who judge should be. To this 
end, the triage conducted shows that at a high court level, judges perform much 
routine administration, dealing with commercial matters that reflect the global 
economic climate. Often these do not simply relate to complex matters of law, but 
rather, more nuanced problems of restitution, debt, sentencing and fairness. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Davis & Klare op cit note 10 at 414. 
117 Id.  
118 2000 (3) SA 845 (SCA).  
119 These difficulties present themselves most starkly in the inherent tensions between the past and the 
future: Roman-Dutch law confronts the Constitution; the common law must be infused with 
constitutional ‘values’; traditional legal reasoning must be balanced by just and equitable outcomes; 
and the institutional culture of the SCA clashes sometimes with the institutional culture of the new 
Constitutional Court. 
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matters a great deal. The HSF, like many, argue that only the finest intellectual and 
skilled practitioners should be appointed to the bench. However, it is clear that the 
skills required are far more varied, and judges perform an array of duties.  
 
Further in terms of the SCA and CC, the work of transforming the law is a 
complicated task, and the SCA often errs. This is less to do with legal ability, and 
more to do with understanding, and embracing, the constitutional mandate of the 
Constitution, and the transformative role that judges play. This signifies that we must 
need something more than mere ‘technical ability’ in order to judge in a transforming 
society.  
 
And so, knowing that: the forms of adjudication are wider than we might think; 
that many cases do not belong in high courts; that judges need more than mere 
technical skill to adjudicate in terms of the Constitution; that judges at a high court are 
not as busy with ‘hard cases’, the foundation upon which we argue who judges should 












CHAPTER II: WHO SHOULD JUDGES BE?  
V South Africa 
Introduction to the administration of justice  
 
Based on Chapter I, Chapter II interrogates the meaning of section 174 of the 
Constitution using the HSF litigation as a discussion point. I criticise HSF for 
perpetuating uncritical assumptions about desirable judicial qualities and abilities. My 
approach is anchored in the transformative mandate of the Constitution, which 
envisions a very particular role for judges in a transforming society. As item 16(6)(a) 
of Schedule 6 to the Constitution dictates: all courts, including their structure, 
composition, functioning and jurisdiction, must be rationalised with a view to 
establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements of the Constitution. I try to 
add meaning to that vision and what it means for those we choose to adjudicate 
disputes in superior courts, particularly in light of the findings in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis. In doing so, I draw on a comparative analysis of the recent developments in 
the United Kingdom brought about by the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 
(‘Constitutional Reform Act’).  
The constitutional mandate 
 
The Constitution was passed as the supreme law of the Republic to achieve the 
following: 120 
1. Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
2. Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
3. Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; 
and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Preamble to the Constitution. 
 31	  
4. Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations. 
Under this constitutional mandate, judicial authority is vested in the Courts.121 The 
courts are independent and subject only to the rule of law.122 The discussion 
document on the transformation of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in 
the developmental South African State (‘Discussion Document’) sets out the role of 
the judiciary and the courts in transforming the state and society. Traditionally, ‘the 
role of courts has been its preserved power to resolve disputes among citizens, and 
between citizens and the state’, but as the Discussion Document explains, ‘in 
constitutional democracies, the judiciary has the significant task of safeguarding and 
protecting the Constitution and its values’.123 In doing so, these uniquely 
transformative features of our Constitution seek to redress the legacy of inequality 
and deprivation implanted during 300 years years’ of colonialism and apartheid.124   
 So any account of adjudication and all that it entails: judicial review – whether 
of executive power, legislation or administrative decision-making – or the adjudication 
of ʻhard casesʼ, or even the regular work of high courts, has to be based on this 
underlying constitutional ʻroleʼ. This raises some interesting questions about 
democracy. Jeremy Waldron,125 for example, has written persuasively that judicial 
review of legislation is undemocratic. However, South Africa has its own version of 
democracy and so, although it seems obvious to say, these problems must be tested 
against this very specific constitutional context. 126 For this reason I have avoided an 
engagement with abstract jurisprudential discussions about what it is that judges do. 
Rather, I have tried to point to the importance of the underlying modus operandi of 
constitutional theory in South Africa and what it means for interpreting section 167 of 
the Constitution.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Section 165(1) of the Constitution.  
122 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
123 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Discussion document on the transformation 
of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in the developmental South African State’ (February, 
2012) at 13.  
124 Id at III. 
125 Waldron op cit note 76.  
126 See section 167 of the Constitution.  
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And so, although it is human nature to forget in the humdrum practice of life, 
the Constitution is a perpetual public declaration that the shared common purpose of 
the judiciary is to deliver equality and justice. The courts therefore have an express 
and powerful mandate to ensure observance of the Constitution.127 This power is 
rooted in the obligation to develop the common law, found in the development clauses 
of sections 39(2) and 8(3) of the Constitution. Important legislative developments such 
as the PAJA add credence to this through, for example, its just and equitable remedy 
in section 8.128 The theory of government, including that of the adjudicative branch 
post 1994 is therefore one based on the idea of ‘transformative constitutionalism’.129 
 
In honouring this constitutional mandate, superior courts very often struggle to 
navigate a precarious binary: traditionally hermeneutic approaches to legal problems, 
and more nuanced approaches to separation of powers; the right to review legislative 
as well as administrative actions and the implications of socio-economic rights, while 
honouring standard philosophical theories of restraint.130 This is no doubt an immense 
social task. A good illustration of how this tension is sometimes interpreted can be 
found in Kriegler Jʼs statement in S v Makwanyane. The former justice states that 
although, ʻjudicial process cannot operate in an ethical vacuum…the incumbents [of 
the Court] are Judges, not sages; their discipline is the law, not ethics or philosophy 
and certainly not politics.ʼ131  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 K O’Regan ‘Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers Under the South African Constitution: FW De Klerk Memorial Lecture, Potchefstroom’ (2005) 8 
Vol 1 PER 120 at 129. See also, K O’Regan “Breaking Ground: Some Thoughts on the Seismic Shift in 
our Administrative Law” (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 424 at 437. 
128 In addition to the common law grounds, where setting aside and correcting were the primary 
remedies, the PAJA provides various other orders: orders to give reasons, declaring rights and in 
exceptional cases, paying compensation. This sets the scene for a difficult balancing act.  See for 
example, Millennium Waste Management v Chairman, Tender Board: Limpopo Province 2008 (2) SA 
481 (SCA) and of AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings & others v The Chief Executive Officer of 
the South African Social Security Agency & others  [2013] ZASCA 29. 
129 See for example, K Klare ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 
146 and A Van der Walt, ‘Transformative Constitutionalism and the Development of South African 
Property Law’ Part 1 (2005) 4 TSAR 655. 
130 For a discussion see JR de Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000).  
131 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 207. See also Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
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 That position is not an entirely true reflection of the CC’s constitutional contract, 
and the record of the CC since then certainly does not bear witness to that testimony. 
Indeed, the CC judges are in some respects ‘sages’, entrusted with a very special 
role: protecting and giving substance to the vision of the Constitution. Having such an 
institution is necessary in a transforming society, where the law and its principles 
require reconstruction. This role includes monitoring the separation of powers, 
deciding on the constitutionality of any amendments to the Constitution, and holding 
the legislature and the executive to the text of the Constitution.132  
In fulfilling its mandate the CC has broken new ground in developing the law 
within the context of South Africa’s broader constitutional democratic project and 
commitment to the principle of legality and the rule of law,133 and in so doing, forced 
judges, to develop a more critical and sophisticated mode of adjudicating the exercise 
of public power. This must be part of their role: laying the foundation for reconstruction 
through the fulfilment of their institutional mandate. The SCA, as judges and as an 
institution, and similarly at a high court level, ought to follow suit.  
 Although there are many illustrations of this mandate, a recent example of how 
this was achieved can be found in the decision in Maphango and Others v Aengus 
Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd, which was heard in November 2011 at the 
Constitutional Court.134 Although as Judge Cameron points out, the narrow question 
in the case was whether a landlord is entitled to cancel a lease and evict its tenants, 
the more important question lay in the impact of the protection the Constitution affords 
against eviction.135 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 K O’Regan ‘Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of 
Powers Under the South African Constitution: FW De Klerk Memorial Lecture, Potchefstroom’ (2005) 8 
Vol 1 PER 120 at 129.  
133 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 
374 (CC) (‘Fedsure’); President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) (‘SARFU’); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: Ex parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) (‘Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association’).  
134 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC).  
135 Id at 1.  
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The applicants were tenants in a block of flats in the inner city of Johannesburg. 
The respondent landlord, a property investment company, bought the building, 
upgraded it, and then wanted to increase the rent.  In order to do so the respondent 
cancelled the leases. In turn, the respondent offered new leases on identical terms, 
though at new and much higher rents. When the tenants resisted the landlord brought 
eviction proceedings. The tenants lost in the South Gauteng High Court and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, protecting the common law right to terminate lease 
agreements. The critical question was whether the landlord was lawfully entitled to 
exercise the bare power of termination in the leases solely to secure higher rents. 
Cameron J held:  
 
‘It is enough to say that in my respectful view the High Court and the Supreme Court 
of Appeal under-assessed the power of the statute. In particular, they overlooked the 
history and setting of the statute, its broad definition of “unfair practice”, its clear 
intimation that invocation of lease terms may constitute an unfair practice and the 
carefully balanced powers that are conferred on the Tribunal.’136 (My emphasis.) 
 
 Judge Cameron provides two important lessons. The first is that, in contrast to 
the SCA, he interrogates the basic assumptions about the law of lease and contract, 
and delivers a judgment which alters the common law in a way that re-imagines how 
the law ought to operate under the Constitution. In doing so, we receive a 
manifestation of the quality, ‘commitment to constitutional values’. This is the kind of 
work that judges are called to do, and it is the kind of work that not only requires 
knowledge of the common law, but the ability to re-imagine it completely.  
Criteria for judicial selection  
 
Knowing the awesome power that judges exercise in a constitutional 
democracy and the powerful constitutional and legislative tools they are equipped with 
to perform that task, who should judges be? What criteria should be used to select 
judges? When a judge takes office, she or he promises to be faithful to the Republic, 
to uphold and protect the Constitution, and to administer justice to all persons without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Id at 56. 
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prejudice, fear, or favour.137 Section 174(1) of the Constitution provides a qualifying 
threshold: to become a judge, you must be ‘appropriately qualified’ and ‘a fit and 
proper person’.138 Section 174(2) further mandates that, ‘[t]he need for the judiciary to 
reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered 
when judicial officers are appointed.’  
 
The public body entrusted with the responsibility of selecting judges is the JSC. 
The JSC was established in terms of Section 178 of the Constitution, and its function 
is to select fit and proper persons for appointment as judges and to investigate 
complaints about judicial officers.139 There can be no dispute that is issue relating to 
processes of the JSC are constitutional matters of profound import.140 The only 
criteria for selection used by the JSC when appointing candidates for judicial 
appointments, which was determined at a Special Sitting held on 10 September 2010, 
are as follows:141  
 
 ‘Criteria stated in the Constitution 
	  
  1. Is the particular applicant an appropriately qualified person?	  
  2. Is he or she a fit and proper person, and 	  
  3. Would his or her appointment help to reflect the racial and gender 
 composition of South Africa?	  
	  
 Supplementary Criteria	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
138 Section 174(1) and (2) reads as follows: 
 
 ‘174. Appointment of judicial officers 
 
 (1) Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper   
 person may be appointed as a judicial officer. Any person to be    
 appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South African   
 citizen.  
 
 (2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and    
 gender composition of South Africa must be considered when    
 judicial officers are appointed.’ (my emphasis). 
 
139 The Judicial Service Commission Act, 9 of 1994. 
140 Hlophe v Premier of the Western Cape Province, Hlophe v Freedom Under Law 2012 (6) SA 13 
(CC). 




  1. Is the proposed appointee a person of integrity? 	  
  2. Is the proposed appointee a person with the necessary energy and  
  motivation? 	  
  3. Is the proposed appointee a competent person?	  
   (a) Technically competent	  
   (b) Capacity to give expression to the values of the Constitution 	  
  4. Is the proposed appointee an experienced person?	  
   (a) Technically experienced	  
   (b) Experienced in regard to values and needs of the community 	  
  5. Does the proposed appointee possess appropriate potential? 	  
  6. Symbolism. What message is given to the community at large by a  
   particular appointment?’	  
 
These criteria are deeply problematic. There is no rational distinction between 
‘criteria stated in the Constitution’ and ‘supplementary criteria’, except that the latter is 
perhaps meant to add substance to the former. The criteria under ‘supplementary 
criteria’ read arbitrarily; for example, they tend to conflate the skill required, i.e., sound 
knowledge of law and its application, with examples of how the abilities would be 
demonstrated, i.e., rapidly absorbs and analyses complex and competing factual and 
legal material. Not only do the content of these criteria remain completely open to 
interpretation as the legislative framework does not expressly detail how they should 
be read together, but the process of deliberation and selection is ‘shrouded in 
obscurity’.142 The procedure for the JSC, established by the JSC’s Rules for 
Procedures, provides no substance to an otherwise summary of the formal 
procedures required for nomination and selection.143  
 
Does the HSF v JSC litigation provide a way forward? 
 
This is perhaps why the JSC has been the subject of litigation in recent years. 
Earlier in April 2011 – before the interviews that gave rise to the HSF litigation – the 
JSC interviewed candidates for judicial appointments in the Western Cape High Court 
(‘WCHC’, or ‘Western Cape High Court’). Of the seven candidates, one was black, six 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council (Centre for Constitutional Rights as amicus curiae) 
(2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) at 53 (‘JSC v Cape Bar Council’).  
143 It simply requires that after completion of the public interviews, the Commission shall deliberate in 
private and shall, if deemed appropriate, select the candidates to be recommended for appointment in 
terms of section 174(4) of the Constitution by consensus or, if necessary, by majority vote.   
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were white and one was a woman. Although all candidates were interviewed, the JSC 
decided to recommend only one of them for judicial appointment, who happened to be 
black. The result was that the other two available positions remained vacant, at least 
until the next meeting of the JSC.144 The Cape Bar Council took umbrage. It 
approached the WCHC for an order declaring, amongst other things, that the 
proceedings were inconsistent with the Constitution, unlawful and consequently 
invalid.145 The WCHC held that the failure by the JSC on 12 April 2011 to fill two 
judicial vacancies was unconstitutional and unlawful. This was confirmed on appeal in 
Judicial Service Commission v Cape Bar Council146 where the SCA held that the JSC 
is under a constitutional obligation to act rationally and transparently in deciding 
whether or not to recommend candidates, which includes giving reasons; the 
response that the particular candidate did not garner enough votes, is no answer.  
 
On 17 October 2012, the JSC interviewed eight candidates for appointment as 
judges of the Western Cape High Court to fill five vacancies at that court. The JSC 
advised the President to appoint the ‘Successful Candidates’.147 On 7 February 2013, 
the President appointed them as such.148 The reception from the legal fraternity was 
mixed.149 Again the JSC was subject to intense scrutiny.  
 
Former Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Mr. Justice Harms 
requested reasons for the JSC’s decision not to recommend Mr Gauntlett, one of the 
‘Unsuccessful Candidates’,150 for judicial appointment. Justice Harms had nominated 
Mr Gauntlett for appointment as a judge. In a letter dated 6 November 2012 (‘the first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 JSC v Cape Bar Council supra note 142 at 2.  
145 Cape Bar Council v Judicial Service Commission (Centre for Constitutional Rights and another as 
amici curiae) 2012 (4) BCLR 406 (WCC).  
146 JSC v Cape Bar Council supra note 142 at 51.  
147 Honourable Madame Justices Judith Cloete and Babalwa Mantame and the Honourable Mr Justices 
Mokgoatji Dolamo, Owen Rogers and Ashton Schippers, as judges of the Court. 
148 ‘President Jacob Zuma appoints Judges to various court divisions’ available at 
http://www.gov.za/speeches/view.php?sid=34102&tid=98038 accessed on 28 January 2014.  
149 N Tolsi ‘JSC 'fixated' on race and gender’ M&G 07 June 2013; C du Plessis ‘The JSC should do 
what Afrikaners did’ City Press 16 June 2013; C du Plessis ‘JSC faces own “spy tapes” debacle’ City 
Press 27 October 2013.  
150 Ms Nonkosi Saba and Messrs Jeremy Gauntlett and Stephen Koen.  
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JSC letter’), the Secretariat of the JSC replied to this request for reasons. In its 
letter,151 the JSC provided the following reasons:  
 
‘As to Advocate Gauntfett SC, his excellence and experience as a lawyer were 
acknowledged. A concern was raised, however, that he has a “short thread” and that 
he can be acerbic at times. Some Commissioners accepted his assurance that as a 
Judge one is removed from the Immediate combative situation that counsel usually 
find themselves in, but strong reservations were also expressed as to whether, as part 
of his attributes, he has the humility and the appropriate temperament that a judicial 
officer should display… 
 
Another very important consideration was the demographic composition of the Cape 
High Court Bench.  It was argued that considering the number of white male Judges in 
that Court as compared to other races was such that were two white males to be 
appointed (at that stage the focus was on Advocates Gauntlett SC and Rogers SC) 
the Commission would be doing violence to the provisions of section 174(2) of the 
Constitution….’ 
  
 These reasons canvass fully the factors taken into account by the JSC when 
exercising its power under the Constitution to advise the President on judicial 
appointments. These reasons form the basis of the current litigation. On 4 June 2013, 
the HSF took the JSC to the Western Cape High Court. The HSF requested the 
following declaration: that the decision taken by the JSC under section 174(6) of the 
Constitution to appoint the Successful Candidates, and not the Unsuccessful 
Candidates, was unlawful and/or irrational and invalid.152 Alternatively, the HSF 
requested a declaration that the process followed by the JSC was unlawful and/or 
irrational and invalid.  
 
At the centre of this litigation is how section 176(1) and (2) should be read. The 
JSC patently distinguishes between the factors of race and gender, which it groups 
together with jurisdictional requirements of section 174(1), on the one hand, and 
relevant factors, which it calls ‘supplementary criteria’. This application raises the 
question of how section 174 of the Constitution can best be interpreted in light of 
South Africa’s broader constitutional project and commitment to the principle of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit, Annexure ‘FA5’. 
152 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 2-3.  
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legality and the rule of law.153 First, it raises the issue of what we mean by fit and 
proper and appropriately qualified. The HSF does not expressly distinguish between 
‘fit and proper’ and ‘appropriately qualified’, but rather provides an open and extensive 
list of factors that together add colour to the idea of who judges should be. They are 
summarised as follows:154 
 
  (i) knowledge of the law; (ii) ability expeditiously to assimilate unfamiliar aspects   
of the law; (iii) analytical ability; (iv) intellectual integrity, (v) impartiality; (vi) a good 
 working knowledge of social, political and economic reality; (vii) a good temperament; 
 (viii) communication skills; empathy, compassion and knowledge of local communities; 
 (ix) a diverse bench to ensure the public’s confidence; and lastly (ix) administrative 
 	  
 
The HSF says that in a constitutional democracy an independent judiciary must 
be staffed by judges of the highest intellectual ability and moral character, who 
understand and live the spirit of the Constitution.155 Second, the injunction created by 
section 174(2) is meant to account for South Africa's unique history and to correct the 
inequalities wrought by a system of discrimination and exclusion, and raises the issue 
of how section 74(1) and (2) should be read together. The HSF argues that describing 
these other factors as supplementary, the JSC on a ‘systemic level’ fails to 
understand the nature of its discretionary power.156 The factor in section 174(2) is 
simply one of the factors, which the JSC is obliged to consider and does not assume 
pre-eminence. In other words,   
 
‘[n]one of these factors, including the race and gender of a particular candidate, will 
 be decisive in all cases. Rather, they form part of a basket of relevant 
 considerations. The JSC is not permitted to pick and choose. All are relevant and 
 all are material.’157  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Fedsure supra note 133; SARFU supra note 133; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association supra 
note 133. 
154 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 34.  
155 Helen Suzman Foundation Press Statement ‘HSF Takes Judicial Service Commission to Court’ 7 
June 2013, available at 
http://politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71654?oid=381717&sn=Detail&pid=71616 
accessed on 28 January 2014.  
156 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 52.  
157 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 35.  
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The protest is that the JSC elevated this factor in section 174(2) to such a level 
of importance that it precluded appointment of more than one white male to the 
WCHC as the bench did not broadly reflect the racial and gender composition of 
South Africa. The HSF considers this an error of law.158 Is the JSC’s position 
defensible? What are the consequences of lumping these criteria together? What 
does ‘appropriately qualified’ mean?  
 
As Cowen points out, the concept of ‘appropriately qualified’ is contested and 
fraught.159 Despite this, there seems to be some consensus: forensic skills; 
intellectual capacity; writing and analytical abilities; knowledge of the law and its 
underlying principles are all necessary.160 Furthermore, the ability to adjudicate 
disputes in a broad range of fields, including constitutional adjudication, which 
requires giving content to the normative value system underlying the Constitution, is 
essential.161 Cowen makes further reference to the increasing need for administrative 
capacity and communication skills.162 Because the superior courts have general 
jurisdiction, and we do not have a highly developed system of special tribunals, other 
than the specialist courts already discussed, the dominant selection theories advocate 
that judges are to have a very diverse skill set.  
 
The limits of this approach, much like the approach to the forms of adjudication, 
although an excellent account of what ‘appropriately qualified’ might mean in a 
country as complicated as South Africa, still suffers from two serious flaws. The first is 
that this approach succumbs to the same fate as those who have not conducted the 
necessary triage of superior court practice. Not knowing what our superior courts are 
doing and to what extent, means that the desirable qualities and abilities favoured are 
often heavily biased. The result is inevitably one of myth-making: ‘[b]ecause some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 47. 
159 The only research in South Africa directly on the constitutional requirements established in section 
174 is Susannah Cowen’s ‘Judicial Selection in South Africa’ (2013) DGRU Working Paper Series, 
available at 
http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/usr/dgru/downloads/Judicial%20SelectionOct2010.pdf 
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fields of law arise more commonly in litigation’ Cowen writes, ‘perhaps commercial 
law, public law and criminal law’ (my emphasis) skill and experience in identified 
areas can be regarded as essential.163 But the previous Chapter illustrated how loose 
and uncritical such discourse is: what is commercial law post the Great Recession? 
How do we understand issues of over-indebtedness, globalisation, trade, reckless 
lending, and how do we situate them within the context of a theory of community; the 
jurisdiction of city-states that high courts are meant to serve?  
 
The approach by the HSF loses ground in a second important way. Although 
the HSF, like Cowen, recognise that the fit between skills and judicial roles may differ 
according to each court, they do not provide a formula to aid the JSC to make more 
sophisticated appointments at each court. By providing a simple basket of desirable 
qualities without a critical understanding of a court’s needs means that the definition 
of merit remains, by and large, trapped in its historical roots. The consequence being 
that the concept of merit continues to mirror the qualities of those candidates who 
currently exercise power: white males with degrees from prominent universities in 
South Africa and abroad, who speak and think in a particular way, without any serious 
strategy for transformation.  
 
The same problems arise with discussions about ‘fit and proper’. Again, there 
is no established set of criteria for determining this requirement. Shientag, in his 1944 
piece, The Personality of a judge chose eight ‘cardinal virtues’, which encompassed a 
characteristic mix of admirable qualities such as: independence and impartiality, 
courtesy and patience, open-mindedness, the virtue of an understanding heart and 
the virtue of social consciousness.164 The HSF cite too, the need for intellectual 
integrity and impartiality, which most people instinctively support. Natural justice 
demands the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua) and the right to a fair 
hearing (audi alteram partem).  
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164 BL Shientag The Personality of a Judge and the Part it Plays in the Administration of Justice (1944).  
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We can accept with no great difficulty that independence, impartiality and 
fairness, integrity, judicial temperament and commitment to constitutional values are 
desirable virtues of good character.165 The importance of the quality of independent-
mindedness is reflected in South Africa’s Guideline for judges.166 To be a judge, you 
need to be able to form your own opinions regardless of the pressure felt, both 
internal and external. This is what Atticus tries to explain to his daughter in the now 
famous book To Kill a Mockingbird, as to why he chose to defend Tom Robinson:167 
‘Atticus, you must be wrong.... said Scout.  
‘How’s that?’  
‘Well, most folks seem to think they’re right and you’re wrong....’ 
‘They’re certainly entitled to think that, and they’re entitled to full respect for their 
opinions,’ said Atticus, ‘but before I can live with other folks I’ve got to live with 
myself. The one thing that doesn’t abide by majority rule is a person’s 
conscience.’168  
Modern pressures, both external and internal, can be ponderous, especially 
those decisions fraught with political consequences or those that might seem to be 
unpopular. S v Makwanyane, again does not disappoint in this regard, and the CC 
emphasised that it would not be diverted from its duty, ‘to act as an independent 
arbiter of the Constitution’.169 But despite the comfort drawn from former Chief Justice 
Chaskalson’s fine words, and the admirable stance in the conviction of his own 
impartiality, recent research shows that judges are not as independent as they might 
think. In his article, If Judges Aren’t Politicians, What Are They?170 Cass Sunstein 
points out that judicial predispositions matter, and they help explain why judges are 
divided on some of the great issues of the day. He argues that judicial voting 
becomes a lot more ideological when judges sit on panels with two others appointed 
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166 Guideline for Judges of South Africa: Judicial Ethics in South Africa (2000). 
167 G Solik ‘Transforming the Judiciary: Who should judges be?’ (2013) 1 PLJ 1 at 4. 
168 H LeeTo Kill a Mockingbird (1966). 
169 The classic example in South Africa is the death penalty decision of the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
170 C Sunstein ‘If Judges Aren’t Politicians, What Are They?’ 
8 January 8 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-08/if-judges-aren-t-politicians-
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by presidents of the same political party and that judges get far more moderate when 
they sit on panels with two other judges appointed by presidents of the other political 
party. 
 
 Indeed, lawyers regularly reach for qualities like intellectual integrity, as the 
HSF has done, or to endorse qualities such as judicial temperament, humility and 
open-mindedness, without any indication of how these actually exist and are 
constrained in practice. In his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize 
author Daniel Kahneman writes about biases and intuition in judgment and decision-
making.171 The aim of the book is to improve the ability to understand errors in 
judgment and choice by providing a richer and more precise language to discuss 
them.172 The book is a tale of two modes of thought: system one, which operates 
automatically and quickly with little effort, and system two which requires effort in 
thinking, usually when apply oneself to more complex computations,173 for example, 
checking the validity of a complex logical argument. 
 
 The book, and the research over many decades, carry instructive lessons for 
those interested in the quality of judicial decision-making. Both the controlled 
operations of system two and the core of system one, continually construct a 
‘coherent’ interpretation of what is going on in the world around us.174 Kahneman 
provides overwhelming evidence that we employ shortcuts of intuitive thinking, which 
result in cognitive biases as manifestations of these heuristics. And that these 
shortcuts embedded in ‘system one’ enjoy overwhelming influence over how we make 
decisions. Because of this, often, although not always, systematic deviations from a 
standard of good judgement in various human behaviours become apparent. Because 
these biases affect belief formation, prejudice, views on happiness, business and 
economic life, it is important that judges are aware of these heuristics in their work. 
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‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 Science 1124, which is available as 
Annexure ‘A’ to the book Thinking, Fast and Slow.  
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Even writing this paper I know that any lawyer who reads these lines will over-
estimate their ability to be impartial, as we are all prone to do.175  
 
 For example, Kahneman recalls a disturbing demonstration of depletion effects 
in judgments in a study reported in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences.176 The participants were eight parole judges in Israel. The applications for 
parole appeared in random order each day, with the judges spending on average 
roughly six minutes on each application. What the researchers found was 65 percent 
of all requests were granted after a food break, whereas the approval rate dropped 
dramatically to about zero percent just before the meal break. This data, as 
Kahneman suggests, provides bad news. Tired and hungry judges tend to fall back on 
easier default position of denying requests for parole.  
 
 You will recall that in 2011/12, high courts enrolled 27 804 new civil matters for 
trial and finalised 28 886 (which included settlements and withdrawals).177 However, 
the high courts received a further 104 884 new motion applications and finalised 82 
431 matters. It thus becomes obvious that motion court is a core component of the 
administration of justice, and therefore potentially, as Kahneman research shows, ripe 
for biases to play themselves out in ways that are potentially unjust. The point being 
that personal heuristics combined with external stimuli entails that judges and those 
that run the administration of justice ought to recognise situations where mistakes are 
probable, and implement mechanisms to avoid avoidable mistakes in routine work, as 
well as when the stake are high. Is this perhaps one explanation of the poor decision 
in Qhinga where the SCA considered and refused an application without the relevant 
information? 
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 Indeed, what the decisions like Brisley v Drotsky178 and Afrox Healthcare179 
show from a socio-psychological perspective, and what critical legal theorists have 
pointed out, was that the supreme court was operating on a shared set of 
assumptions – heuristics – which in turn lead to biases, about the way in which 
ordinary people enter into contracts, and how the foundations of the law over time, 
through principle and precedent, corroborate unproven factual scenarios, or scenarios 
that have changed over time: ‘[a] reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is 
frequent repetition, because familiarity is not easily distinguished from truth’.180  
 
Kahneman’s work serve’s as a criticism of the HSF’s far too ready acceptance 
of concepts such as independence and impartiality without locating them within a 
more rigorous discourse about natural cognitive constraints and external influences 
on judicial decision-making. Especially in everyday judging, but also of course in our 
appeal courts. That is not to say we should not work hard to identify independent 
though-leaders; of course, we should, but we need to focus on entrenching 
impartiality through institutional and personal safeguards. As Justice O’Regan 
recently points out, we must keep prejudices in check:181 
  ‘If all judges are from the same background, she explained it is easy to entrench 
 prejudice and it is not easy to know your own prejudice. Diversity makes us 
 aware of our prejudices, and thus promotes open-mindedness in the judiciary.’182 
One of the most powerful ways to do this is to have a diverse bench. This is where the 
HSF Litigation becomes so important for the legal profession: 
‘Judicial diversity is likely to increase judicial dissent and hence, as we have seen, 
improve the quality of decisions.  Against the backdrop of the American legal system, 
Sunstein suggests that the Chief Judges who appoint three-judge  panelsshould 
appoint panels in American courts with a mix of Republicans and Democrats. While 
South Africa does not share the stark political divide that America enjoys, there is 
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certainly value in ensuring that panels of judges do not all share a common 
background.’183 
 In terms of race, and from a textual perspective, regard must be had to the 
words ‘must be considered’ in section 174(2) of the Constitution. To consider 
something means to ‘take it into account’ and ‘considered’, the past participle of 
‘consider’, means to ‘think carefully about something before making a decision.’184 
‘Must’ naturally indicates that there is an obligation to consider. The HSF recognises 
that section 174(2) is meant to account for South Africa’s unique history and to correct 
the inequalities ‘wrought by a system of discrimination and exclusion’.185 They also 
recognise that ‘an essential feature of a successful legal system is that it is 
considered legitimate by the people over whom it presides.’186 Despite this, the HSF 
submits that the JSC cannot operate in a way that discards other relevant factors. The 
JSC is not entitled to pick and choose. All are relevant and material. And so, while 
race and gender are materially relevant, considering ‘humility and judicial 
temperament’ as a decisive factor in Gauntlett’s appointment means that the JSC 
failed to consider the relevant factors it delineated above.187  
 To my mind, at any rate, this reasoning seems self-defeating. The Constitution 
is very clear: the JSC is entitled to consider questions of race every time it makes 
appointments, and its exercise of power has to meet the threshold requirement of 
rationality, as all exercise of power is subject to the rule of law and principle of 
legality.188 In light of the transformative mandate of the Constitution, I am of the 
opinion that in principle the JSC is entitled not to appoint a white man to the bench 
because of the racial profile of that bench, provided the reasons disclosed give effect 
to a defensible plan of redress, including the work of that court, and the skills that the 
JSC is looking to acquire. Whether the bald assertion in this case can be defended 
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187 HSF v JSC Founding Affidavit at 40-41.  
188 Sergeant at the Bar, ‘Greater transparency could encourage better JSC appointments’ M&G 23 
November 2012, and the views expressed by the Institute for Accountability in South Africa available at 
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remains to be seen, but it does elicit a far more difficult decision that commentators 
have led us to believe.189  
 First, as Kate Malleson points out, the problem with a lack of diversity is that, 
‘[o]ne almost inevitable effect of selecting judges from a narrow group is that the 
characteristics of that group tend to become synonymous with merit.'190 The HSF 
feels there is a great loss to the system because Mr Gauntlett epitomises for them, 
and many others, the ideal judge. But Mr Gauntlett, as technically skilled as he no 
doubt is, has to be considered within a far broader framework of merit, from a far 
wider perspective, which includes the expectations of millions of ordinary South 
Africans.  
 The second related point is that the pool of available candidates for judicial 
appointments is so thin that unless ‘radical’ interventions are made, such as not 
appointing someone like Mr Gauntlett within the context of this case, the bench will 
continue to be characterised by a distinctive white hue. Black female advocates make 
up four percent of the profession compared to the 57 percent of white males (89 and  
1 367, out of a total of 2 384 advocates respectively) with 69 Indian and just 37 
coloured female advocates in the entire country.191 A recent survey of large corporate 
law firms showed the disparity not only between racial composition but also between 
race, position, and influence, paints a bleak picture.192 Whatever the legal and political 
approach to race ensues in the courts, the JSC cannot ignore hundreds of years of 
racial inequality, and the manifestation of that history; the day-to-day reality of 
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geographic, linguistic and class inequality in South Africa. As the Constitutional Court 
held in Bato Star:193 
 ‘Our Constitution recognises that decades of systematic racial discrimination entrenched  by 
 the apartheid legal order cannot be eliminated without positive action being taken to achieve 
 that result. We are required to do more than that. The effects of discrimination may continue 
 indefinitely unless there is a commitment to end it.’ 
 Having said that, I must qualify the statement with a third related point. As I 
have argued elsewhere,194 there are serious problems with an unthinking and racial 
application of the diversity rational. The diversity rationale must be understood in 
terms of class and other socioeconomic factors if we are serious about addressing 
inequality and representivity.  It also needs to take account of a candidate’s 
commitment to constitutional values. What this decision signifies, more than 
irrationality, is the loss of faith in the JSC after a series of questionable decisions, 
which are shrouded in procedure that lacks transparency, and by implication, 
accountability.  
VI The United Kingdom 
Introduction: in thinking about the selection criteria, what can we learn from the 
UK 
 
In the United Kingdom, prior to the Constitutional Reform Act judges were 
appointed by a politician, the Lord Chancellor.  What is more, the court of final appeal 
was the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which was nominally part of the 
legislature, although in law and practice, an independent court.195 The system of 
judicial selection prior to the mid-1990s was guided by three strict principles: 
appointment should be strictly on merit; part-time judicial appointment was favourable 
before receiving full-time appointments; and significant weight was attached to the 
independent views of the judiciary and members of the legal profession in considering 
candidates for judicial appointment.196 As Lord Mackay points out, ‘I considered it a 
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cardinal principle to appoint to each post the candidate who appeared to me the best 
qualified…this principle was to prevail, without regard to gender, ethnic origin, marital 
status, sexual orientation, political inclination, religion or disability.’197 
 
The reform however, began in earnest with the introduction of the Courts and 
Services Act 1990, with the aim to broaden the qualifications for appointments.198 
Later, in 1993, after the review of the judicial appointments system, a programme of 
development was introduced.199 The idea was to build on the strengths of the existing 
system and to make the appointments system as efficient, fair and open as 
possible.200 The reform comprised amongst other things: measures to improve 
arrangements for forecasting and planning the numbers and expertise of the judges 
required at the various levels, and preparation of more specific descriptions of the 
work of the judicial posts to be filled and the qualities required.201  
 
By July 1994 specific criteria for appointment of circuit and district judges was 
announced as the framework within which the merits of individual candidates were to 
be considered. The following stand alone criteria included:  
 
• Appropriate levels of legal knowledge and experience; 
• Intellectual and analytical ability; 
• Sound judgment;  
• Decisiveness;  
• Ability to communicate effectively;  
• Ability command respect of the court users and maintain the authority of the 
court; 
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• Integrity;  
• Fairness; 
• An understanding of society;  
• Sound temperament; 
• Courtesy and humanity; and  
• Commitment to public service and to the proper and efficient administration 
of justice. 
 
What is so intriguing is that these criteria comprising a combination of 
professional skills and personal qualities remain so influential on the criteria used 
today. What we see now is that the criteria are organised more specifically 
thematically, but in substance they remain the same.  
 
With a change of government in 1997, Lord Irvine, the new Lord Chancellor, 
was expected to establish a Judicial Appointments Commission, as an advisory 
body.202 This did not happen. Instead, the Chancellor modified the open competition 
procedures, which had been introduced in the mid-1990s.203 In 1999, the Lord 
Chancellor asked Sir Leonard Peach, the former Commissioner for Public 
Appointments, to scrutinise the judicial appointments process.204 Following the Peach 
Report, the criteria for appointment were amended, where for example, it was now 
clearly stated that advocacy experience was not an essential requirement for public 
office.205 The Lord Chancellor, like his predecessor, made modest, but no doubt 
significant developments in reaching out to those not normally considered for judicial 
office: woman, and those of ethnic minority origin.206 The office of magistrates too, for 
example, was opened to blind and partially slighted candidates, and introduced 
arrangements for flexibility in relation to part-time judicial sittings so that, ‘those that 
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had taken a career break could catch up more quickly…before they could be 
considered for full-time appointment.’207 
 
In 2003, the establishment of a judicial appointments commission by the UK 
government took the world by surprise.208 The JAC was set up under the 
Constitutional Reform Act and launched on 3 April 2006. The JAC is an independent 
commission that selects candidates for judicial office in courts and tribunals in 
England and Wales.209 Under the Constitutional Reform Act, the JAC has very 
specific duties in regard to the selection of judges. These statutory responsibilities 
are:210  
• to select candidates solely on merit; 211 
• to select only people of good character; and 
• to have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons 
available for judicial selection.212 
 
Importantly, the JAC does not select judicial office-holders for the UK Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, in terms of the UK Supreme Court, a person is not qualified to be 
appointed a judge of the UK Supreme Court unless he has: (a) held high judicial office 
for a period of at least 2 years; or (b) been a qualifying practitioner for a period of at 
least 15 years.213 According to Jonathan Sumption OBE QC, ‘[t]he scheme of the Act 
is intolerably clear. The Commission’s duty is to do its best to encourage applications 
from the widest-possible range of eligible candidates…but having done so it must 
select among them according to their aptitude for the job and nothing else.’214 Apart 
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214 Sumption op cit note 211 at 37. 
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from the overriding requirement that judges selected must be of ‘good character’, 
merit is the only permissible criterion. There are therefore no quotas and targets for 
under-represented groups. However, by encouraging diverse applications, the JAC 
believes it will strengthen judicial independence, diversify the composition of the 
judiciary, maintain and enhance the quality of the appointments and raise public 
Confidence in the system.215  
Criteria   
 
The JAC has developed a set of ‘Qualities and Abilities’ against which to 
measure merit and these are adjusted as appropriate for different appointments.216 As 
the JAC explains on its website, ‘[a]pplicants for each selection exercise will be 
assessed against five of the six following qualities and abilities. For example, for posts 
requiring particular leadership skills, the efficiency quality may be replaced by the 
leadership and management skills quality.’ 217 (My emphasis.) The role of the JAC is 
to select and recommend candidates, not to appoint them. The skills are summarised 
below: 
1. Intellectual Capacity 
• Expertise in your chosen area of profession; 
• Ability to quickly absorb and analyse information; and 
• Appropriate knowledge of the law and its underlying principles, or the 
ability to acquire this knowledge where necessary. 
 
2. Personal Qualities 
• Integrity and independence of mind; 
• Sound judgement; 
• Decisiveness; 
• Objectivity; and 
• Ability and willingness to learn and develop professionally. 
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3. An Ability to Understand and Deal Fairly 
• An awareness of the diversity of the communities, which the courts and 
tribunals serve and an understanding of differing needs; 
• Commitment to justice, independence, public service and fair treatment; 
and 
• Willingness to listen with patience and courtesy. 
 
4. Authority and Communication Skills 
• Ability to explain the procedure and any decisions reached clearly and 
succinctly to all those involved; 
• Ability to inspire respect and confidence; and 
• Ability to maintain authority when challenged. 
 
5. Efficiency  
• Ability to work at speed and under pressure; 
• Ability to organise time effectively and produce clear reasoned 
judgments expeditiously; and 
• Ability to work constructively with others. 
 
6. Leadership and Management Skills 
• Ability to form strategic objectives and to provide leadership to 
implement them effectively; 
• Ability to motivate, support and encourage the professional development 
of those for whom you are responsible;  
• Ability to engage constructively with judicial colleagues and the 
administration, and to manage change effectively; 




 It bears emphasis that the development in the UK judicial appointments 
process was incrementally conducted over a 16-year period. Each new development 
subject to professional consultation and public comment, slowly moving towards a 
more robust understanding of judging, and therefore appointments. It is also 
noteworthy that the criteria are periodically reviewed, and sometimes altered, as the 
requirements of the bench evolve. For example, the ‘Ability to Understand and Deal 
Fairly’ criterion has recently been amended. The JAC issued a consultation document 
aimed at all those with an interest in judicial appointments, including the judiciary, 
legal professional bodies and groups with an interest in diversity.218 They wanted to 
know if the current merit criterion should be amended. The JAC proposed the 
following:  
 
‘Social Awareness, Fairness and Public Service  
• An awareness and understanding, acquired by relevant experience,  
of diversity of the communities, which the courts serve.  
• Scrupulous commitment to fair treatment and an understanding of the 
      differing needs of court users.  
• Commitment to public service, preferably demonstrated through experience.’ 
 
 After consultation, the JAC released a document titled, ‘Response of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission to the consultation exercise on amending the 
JAC’s merit.’219 The JAC did not get its own way. The criterion ‘An Ability to 
Understand and Deal Fairly’ was not changed to ‘Social Awareness, Fairness and 
Public Service’, and the content is remains as quoted above.220 What is instructive 
here, is that the JAC was informed by what the legal community thought most fitting, 
and incorporated their suggestions in order to produce a more relevant version of the 
criterion.   
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 The JAC is patently committed to transforming the judiciary by increasing the 
diversity of judicial appointments, and goes to some lengths to reach out to 
candidates that might not ordinarily consider themselves to be appropriate candidates. 
It would seem that part of this success, is challenging the stereotypes around who 
judges should be, and critically assessing which skills are needed for specific posts. 
For example, the main provisions of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007 
(‘TCE Act’), which came into force during 2008, extends the range of people who may 
qualify for judicial appointment. In order to be eligible for judicial appointment, you 
must not only be in possession of the relevant qualification, but must also have been 
undergone a ‘qualifying period’, which involves being engaged in ‘law related activity’ 
whilst holding that qualification.221 Law related activities are specifically broad in 
connotation: advising (whether or not in the course of practice or employment as a 
lawyer) on the application of the law; drafting (whether or not in the course of such 
practice) documents intended to affect persons’ rights or obligations; and teaching or 
researching law, irrespective whether full or part-time or for remuneration.222  
 
VII Conclusion  
 
 The purpose of Chapter II was to establish the constitutional framework within 
which judges operate. Central to the constitutional mandate is that judges are tasked 
with the responsibility, which is especially acute at the CC, to generate social 
possibilities through the interpretation of law under the promise of the Constitution. 
The last two decades have born witness to the dichotomy of navigating the radical 
promise of a democratic and sovereign state. The CC has shown how this can be 
done, but more work, more creativity is necessary. The high courts, as well as the 
SCA need to more fully embrace this trajectory. One way to do this would be to 
rethink, or at least, re-examine some of the basic assumptions about the criteria for 
judicial selection, and by implication, who judges should be. To this end, I have shown 
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that popular conceptions of appropriately qualified typified by the HSF Litigation is 
largely uncritical.  
 
 The same can be said for fit and proper, and judges and government should 
become more aware of these problems in order to protect good decision-making. The 
reform in the United Kingdom is a rich resource, and we would do well to build on 
some of these developments.  Key to their success seems to be: (i) the time taken 
slowly to reform the criteria through constant engagement with the legal profession 
and the broader community; (ii) an acknowledgment that transformation of the 
judiciary entails transformation of judicial institutions, through for example, the use of 
tribunals; and (iii) their merit criterion, although not perfect, is far wider than South 
Africa’s and because of this, they understand more critically what kind of skills are 


























CHAPTER III: TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA FOR 
SELECTION 
 
VIII Introduction  
 
 Chapters I and II have shown that superior courts, especially at the level of the 
high court, point to a giant mismatch between the needs of the communities that they 
are meant to serve and the everyday court work they carry out. The commercialisation 
of the legal profession finds itself a centre stage where its script is a monotonous tale 
about money and how best to collect, preserve, reclaim and enforce the rules around 
which economics of the day can be enforced. Contemporary legal thought and its 
articulation is yet to give nearly enough weight to private capital and its opposition to 
radical democratic change. The record of the SCA in the year 2011 is itself, too, a 
snapshot of a longer track record, which illustrates that the SCA still grapples with the 
transformative mandate of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court as an institution, 
is geared aesthetically, psychologically and legally towards rebuilding the law of South 
Africa, and this is part of its success.  
 
The most egregious laws of apartheid had to do with land tenure, geographic 
segregation and freedom of movement though pass laws and influx control.223 But the 
effects of the pervasive control over communities in South Africa remain. Because 
many South African communities still suffer from inequality in services such as 
education, health and sanitation; because the economic and social life in rural areas 
and the slums that hug the city edges are considered dirty and informal, the possibility 
of raising judges – because it is about ‘raising judges’ – from these communities 
remains fraught with challenges. The consequences of People do not litigate in 
superior courts, and when they do, corporations, civil society organisations or 
government act as their representatives. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 The Natives Land Act, 27 of 1913; The Group Areas Act, 41 of 1950 (re-enacted in 1957 and 1966); 
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and Works Act, 12 of 1911.  
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 In the main, the forms of superior court practice remain giant sentinels to both 
apartheid spatial planning and its legal and political thinking. If there is any doubt 
about this proposition one simply need remember that while there are 13 high courts 
there are as many as 384 magisterial districts; although there are 237 judges at the 
superior courts, there are roughly 1700 magistrates around the country.224 And what 
do these superior courts do that is more important that magistrate courts? Mostly 
nothing, except in cases involving the development of the common law, and serious 
criminal or civil cases, which happen far less then we think. For the most part, judges, 
like magistrates, are adjudicating everyday day disputes in accordance with the law.  
 
  Judges at a superior court may be more ‘skilled’, but the reason for this 
structural and jurisdictional design is not a problem of lower court competence, as is 
commonly proffered. It is in the first place, a problem of imagination. And it is a crisis 
of community. The fact that high courts have failed to reflect on their own practices 
and busy themselves with the important work of ordinary people; the fact that the SCA 
and the CC have not joined forces to create a dynamic space for legal reconstruction; 
the fact that we do not have the energy to reorganise and reconstruct forms of 
adjudication; the fact that we do not have serious judicial training institutes, are all 
manifestations of this institutional recidivism. The need for superior court practice 
triage is therefore both necessary and urgent. Despite this, however, the specialised 
courts provide hope. They are witnesses to the possibility of transformative 
constitutionalism in the design, practice and adjudication of common social problems.  
 
 Armed with this information Chapter II has shown that we must set about the 
important task of choosing who judges should be with a renewed understanding of 
their skills and qualities. These jurists must be capable of performing the tasks 
necessary for the resolution of disputes in a transforming society and all that that 
encompasses. This task is challenging, varied and daunting. Men and women of 
integrity, honesty and a encompassing a deep understanding of society under the 
Constitution must together figure out how this can be done. The Constitution is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 SA Yearbook 2011/2012 op cit not 41 at 341-347. 
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powerful enabler that provides both the foundation for this structural re-design and the 
legal tools necessary for its completion.  
 
 The litigation by the HSF must not be allowed to define the parameters of who 
we think judges should be. The notions of fit and proper and appropriately qualified 
offered are bereft of any critical understanding of adjudication and lure us back into 
the same centre stage shared by corporations, wealthy individuals and government 
departments. The reform found in the United Kingdom provides a spark of inspiration 
and we should take this opportunity to redirect the conversation based on this more 
thorough and useful conceptualisation. Importantly, we learn that the selection criteria 
evolve slowly and organically through consultation and refection and we should 
embrace this process. This provides more than anything, a strategy for change. Yet, 
despite this progress, the UK too, ultimately suffers from the same legal conservatism.  
IX Constraints  
 
 In the first place both concepts of good character and merit, or ‘fit and proper’ 
and ‘appropriately qualified’, represent a simple and unsophisticated aggregation of 
desirable qualities that are used to induce lawyers and citizens alike to unwittingly 
accept, and find comfort in, the Mythopoeia of Hercules J. As Jeremy Waldron 
observes, it was John Locke who famously rejected the idea that legal reasoning was 
superior to any other kind of reasoning: 
 
  “Certainly Locke rejected out of hand the view — very common today — that on 
 issues of rights the reasoning of judicial officers (Supreme Court Justices and their 
 clerks) is to be preferred to reason and judgment of ordinary men and women. The 
 reasoning of legal scholars on matters of rights he regarded as ‘artificial Ignorance. 
 And learned Gibberish.’”225  
 
 In the second place, both regimes confuse ‘Intellectual Ability’ with ‘Knowledge 
of the Law’. In terms of Intellectual Ability, what we should be speaking of is critical 
thinking skills, which is a way of deciding whether a claim is true or false. Critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 J Waldron ‘Participation: The Rights of Rights’ (1998) 98 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 307 
at 337. 
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thinking can be learned, practiced and mastered. In terms of legal knowledge, 
expertise in a chosen area of law should be a qualifying threshold to indicate 
dedication to, and experience of a certain area of law, but not as an illustration of 
ownership over it.  To think of ourselves as experts is a telltale sign of creative and 
imaginative degeneration where answers are found in what we ‘know’, instead of what 
we can discover, learn and create. The proliferation of laws both international and 
national, itself a consequence of heightened globalisation, must surely mean that we 
must staff benches not with people who claim to know, but who illustrate competence 
at finding out.226  Further, ‘knowledge’ of the law here must expand to connote the 
operation of law in social life or a ‘law related activity’.  
 
 In the third place, the discussion of personal qualities tends to devolve into a 
fictional account of desirable qualities such as integrity and independence without a 
concomitant discussion about natural biases and heuristics present in everyday court 
adjudication. It is understandable that the capacity for honesty, intellectual or 
otherwise is considered the noblest of all judicial character traits; the statement that 
honesty is the first chapter in the Book of Wisdom perhaps best captures why.227 
Indeed, as former Chief Justice Pius Langa remarked at the Bram Fischer Lecture, 
‘[t]here is no doubt that the world, and this country in particular, are in dire need of 
men and women of courage who follow the dictates of their conscience.’228 But as 
Chapter II has uncovered, humans are not nearly as independent as they might think 
– class, race, gender, and schooling all influence decision-making. And so it is not 
merely the character trait of holding fast to one’s beliefs that we should consider 
admirable, but conversely, the commitment to abandoning those beliefs altogether, in 
the hope that a new understanding, a step closer towards justice, may be revealed 
and handed down: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 See for example, P Howard ‘It’s time to Clean House’, Atlantic Monthly, 14 March 2012 available at 
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February 2014.  
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 “Impartiality is rather difficult to obtain in any system. I am not speaking of 
 conscious impartiality, but the habits you are trained in, the people with whom you 
 mix, lead to your having a certain class of ideas of such a nature that, when you have 
 to deal with other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate judgements as you 
 would wish”229  
 
 
 Fourthly, the skills in the UK model: ‘An Ability to Understand and Deal Fairly’; 
‘The Ability to Communicate’; ‘Work Efficiently’; ‘Administrative Skills’; and 
‘Leadership Skills’ are not predominantly legal skills. In fact, out of the six classes of 
skills, ‘legal skills’ is mentioned once. Yet legal skills are treated almost always as the 
stronghold of merit. This is because as I have shown, we overestimate the amount of 
‘hard cases’ judges adjudicate and underestimate how much adjudication is about 
routine administration, problem solving, coordinating case management, 
communication and speedy resolution. That is the work that communities demand. 
 
 Fifthly, the closest attribute indicative of wisdom and a capacity for discernment 
is the requirement: ‘An Ability to Understand and Deal Fairly’. But what is that skill? 
How do we develop an awareness of the diversity of communities if the bench is 
narrow in composition when the community in South Africa is wide. What is a 
commitment to justice, independence, public service and fair treatment? How do we 
test for that? Why is a willingness to listen with patience and courtesy important when 
the SCA and the CC decide matters predominantly on the papers? Neatening up our 
thinking about judges and adding substance to the criteria for testing aspirant judicial 
officers will allow us the chance to deepen our democracy.230  
X The Constitutional imagination   
 
The passage from Exodus was intentionally used as a primer for the deeper 
implications of my analysis. Moses was an old-testament prophet whose task was to 
establish an alternative community. He was to nourish, nurture and evoke a 
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consciousness and perception that was an alternative to the dominant culture.231 His 
job was to teach people the rules and instructions, to show them how to live, and what 
to do. Part of this entailed keeping a sharp eye out for competent men — men of 
integrity, men who are incorruptible — and appoint them as leaders over groups 
organized by the needs of the community. These young men and women of integrity 
would be taught and given the responsibility for the everyday work of judging among 
the people. The hard cases that would be brought to Moses.  
 
But what the Constitution offers is a foundation for building alternative 
communities based on human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancements of human rights and freedoms. But it is merely that: a blueprint. The 
role of judges in South Africa should not be confined by narrow debates about 
separation of powers theory or the proper role of the courts in a democracy. The 
answers to those questions, although important, are located within the broader 
framework of our constitutional theory, which underpins the working of society and the 
regulation of power. To be sure, Parliament is the national forum for the public 
consideration of issues, passing legislation and scrutinising and overseeing executive 
action.232 The executive, local government, Chapter 9 Institutions, Provinces – all 
have their respective roles to grow into. The role of the courts is not to usurp those 
functions as delineated in the Constitution. Parliament is responsible for drafting the 
laws of this country in order to build a sovereign and democratic country. Judges must 
always guard with jealousy the vision of the Constitution, and it is their roles as 
watchmen and women to preserve that vision in ways that is constitutionally 
permissible.  
 
In order to do this, Davis and Klare point out that the development clauses 
place two very specific duties on judges.233 The first is the duty to ‘actively promote 
constitutional values, rather than merely assure the conformity of judge-made law to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 W Brueggemann The Prophetic Imagination (1978) at 13. I borrow the two central ideas from his 
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232 Section 42(3) of the Constitution. 
233 Davis & Klare op cit note 10 at 410.  
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constitutional strictures’. This concerns not just the coherence of the legal order, ‘but 
its character’. The second is ‘re-imaging the common law’, which they suggest is 
‘critically important to the success of the constitutional enterprise as a whole’. That 
enterprise being of course, ‘to establish a society based on social justice and 
improved quality of life for all citizens’.234  
 
The authors touch on the very substance of the missing ingredient in 
discussions about the skill of administering justice without fully giving meaning to what 
they mean. The authors lament that apart from a few generalisations, the courts have 
made little effort to ‘theorise the Constitution’s impact on the common law’ and, ‘to 
sketch the content of the constitutional vision of a free and equal society.’235 But both 
‘visioning’, and ‘theorising’ – as character traits of those who understand the 
confluence of politics, law and society – are two very specific skills that have 
absolutely nothing to do with law. People who are especially talented in the futuristic 
theme are inspired by the future and what it could look like. How this skill can take 
shape, be developed and sustained, how we can devise strategies for its 
implementation, has eluded lawyers. To simply suggest that judges may employ the 
technique of envisioning alternatives for society based on the law without any 
discussion of how this unique skill may be identified, taught and developed, offers a 
death knell for the constitutional legal analysis envisioned by Davis and Klare.  
 
It would help to name this ability, ‘constitutional imagination’. Imagination at its 
core has to do with the capacity to envision, invent, create and be authentic.236 
Imagination is the step before implementation.237 Imagining is about nourishing and 
nurturing a legal consciousness that is at once rooted in our history and politics while 
simultaneously pointing to the aspirations codified in the Constitution. Constitutional 
imagination must be rooted in the history of South Africa and the operation and 
injustices of the law. This will have a significant impact on the parameters of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC) 
at para 36, quoted in Davis & Klare op cit note 10 at 410.  
235 Davis & Klare op cit note 10 at 414.  
236 Oxford Thesaurus of Current English (2006) at 220. 
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constitutional imagination in South Africa.238 Here, judges must remember, and re-
appropriate, the memories of its communities like Russian matryoshka dolls, stories 
within stories portraying personal patterns of human struggle, and continue to sketch 
out and add substance to the story of democracy. 
 
Judges are always judges over communities and this must never be forgotten 
no matter how lost the idea has become. The legal profession has a unique position in 
communities across the world. Not only is its distinguishing feature that it alone 
among the professions is concerned with protecting the rights of citizens against 
public and private infringements but its historic function has been the protection of 
rights of the most vulnerable.239  
 
The role of constitutional imagination is to, in the first place, criticise and 
dismantle the Roman-Dutch common legal law system.240 Roberto Unger has written 
about the call to take law and legal analysis back to its original purpose: to inform us, 
as citizens, in the attempt to imagine our alternative futures and to argue about 
them.241 This sees the purpose of legal analysis within the walls of the courtroom and 
under the adjudication of judges as a place where the practices and exchanges, 
bargains and wrongdoings come under scrutiny, and the conduct is held accountable 
according to the overarching democratic vision established by the Constitution.  This 
is about raising judges to understand the relationship between the institution of 
adjudication and the spirit of constitutional imagination, between practical 
arrangements and aspirational forms of life, between the past and the future.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 H Klug ‘Constitution-Making, Democracy and the “Civilizing” of Irreconcilable Conflict: What Might 
We Learn From the South African Miracle’ (2007) 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal 269. 
239 LaBelle v Law Society of Upper Canada (2001) 28255 (ON SC), “The legal profession has a unique 
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Judges have done exactly this – O’Regan in K v the Minister, Cameron J in 
Maphango, Khampepe J in Mankayi, as well as in a series of cases of what Davis and 
Klare would call the ‘boundary cases’, which are the very best examples of 
constitutionally inspired common law development – but not as often as is 
necessary.242 In order to continue this process of reconstruction, there has to be a 
continual resistance to the dominant and powerful legal culture, which naturally resists 
this change. Imagination is central to this task of legal reformation because the 
Constitution, and the legislative enactments giving effect thereto, provide judges with 
powers which they have not previously claimed, and which permits and requires new 
and innovative judicial interventions.243  
 
The role of constitutional imagination in the second place is to energise and 
communicate to litigants as citizens of the democratic state the promise of the 
constitutional democracy envisioned. Constitutional Court justices have a special role, 
but judges of superior courts, including specialised courts must do this too, through 
the ordinary work of adjudication, analysis, restitution, protection of rights, orders of 
equity and sentencing. Here judges become protectors of the original trajectory South 
Africa chose to embark on. As Walter Bruegemann has written, the task of criticism 
and energising must be held together,244 because it is the binary nature of this work 
that keeps the wheels of justice turning.  
 
This constitutional imagination is not just about adjudication. As has been 
maintained throughout this thesis it is about renewal within the chain of interrelated 
problems in the law and legal theory. And so it needs to be embodied in institutional 
arrangements as well; the courtroom design and conception, so that the possibilities 
of remaking society, politics, and the economy remain hopeful. With this in mind, I 
have drafted draft criteria for the selection of judges, set out below. 
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XII New draft JSC Criteria	  
 
PREAMBLE  
The Constitution was passed as the supreme law of the Republic to achieve the 
following: 
1. Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
2. Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; 
3. Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; 
and 
4. Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations. 
THE CONSTITUTION  
The Constitution established the following requirements for judicial selection: 
 
 ‘174. Appointment of judicial officers 
 
  (1) Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper  
   person may be appointed as a judicial officer. Any person to be  
   appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South  
   African citizen.  
 
  (2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and   
   gender composition of South Africa must be considered when  
   judicial officers are appointed.’ (my emphasis). 
 
CRITERIA IN TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION  
Threshold requirements: for all candidates at all courts and tribunals 
 
(i) Substantial Knowledge and Experience of the Law and its Operation in 
South Africa 
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• Expertise in a chosen area of profession; 
• Experience of how the law operates, or experience in a law related 
activity; and 
• Appropriate knowledge of underlying principles of the Roman-Dutch/ 
English common law system as well as customary law. 
 
(ii) Advanced Critical Thinking Skills 
• Proven ability to quickly absorb and analyse information; 
• The ability to acquire this knowledge where necessary; and 
• The ability to critically interpret, anaylse and evaluate competing 
claims. 
 
(iii) An Ability to Understand and Deal Fairly 
 
• An awareness of the diversity of the communities, which the courts 
serve and an understanding of the differing needs; 
• Commitment to justice, independence, public service and fair 
treatment; and 
• Sound judgment. 
 
(iv) Integrity  
• Honesty; 
• The virtue of an understanding heart; 
• An awareness of prejudices; and 
• Good standing in the community. 
 
Optional criteria: assessed in light of the court or tribunal in question. Judges 
need not display all qualities but should display at least one 
 
(v) Constitutional Imagination: 
• Appropriate knowledge of historical, sociological, ethical, and political 
workings of the South African Constitution; 
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• Capable of giving expression to the values of the Constitution; 
• Appropriate knowledge of constitutional jurisprudence; and 
• Commitment to the constitutional project. 
 
(vi) Authority and Communication Skills 
• Ability to explain the procedure and any decisions reached clearly and 
succinctly to all those involved; 
• Ability to inspire respect and confidence; and 
• Ability to maintain authority when challenged. 
 
(vii) Efficiency  
• Ability to work at speed and under pressure; 
• Ability to organise time effectively and produce clear reasoned 
judgments expeditiously; and 
• Ability to work constructively with others. 
 
(viii) Leadership and Management Skills 
• Ability to form strategic objectives and to provide leadership to 
implement them effectively; 
• Ability to motivate, support and encourage the professional development 
of those for whom you are responsible;  
• Ability to engage constructively with judicial colleagues and the 
administration, and to manage change effectively; and 
• Ability to organise own and others time and manage available 
resources. 
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Instructions for using criteria  
 These draft criteria will hopefully spark a debate. The threshold criteria apply to 
every judge at every court. Aspirant judges must satisfy these requirements. The 
Department of Justice should through the Judicial Education Institute start preparing 
classes on critical thinking, and aspirant judges should know that this is a skill that will 
be required. This skill can be learnt and developed. The optional criteria can be used 
by the JSC to justify certain appointments after conducting the necessary triage: they 
may want leadership skills specifically at the expense of other qualities, or strong and 
efficient judges for a busy court, or a judge that has the requisite constitutional 
imagination. The point being here, that judges are not everything all at once, although 

















The earlier comparison of the adjudication of football matches, and the matters 
usually found in court, although broadly justifiable, is patently problematic. One major 
problem is that the skill required to adjudicate football games is fairly consistent, 
because the game is universally standardised: it takes place in one kind of arena with 
universal rules and principles. Adjudication in the courts on the other hand, although it 
may legitimately adjudicate whether a referee was biased in his adjudication of a 
football match, encompasses a wide array of rules and principles, often taking place 
in different arenas. Sometimes it may involve questions of family life, or over-
indebtedness, and sometimes it involves the awesome exercises of adjudicative 
power: a National Assembly blocking a vote of no confidence to impeach a 
President.245 
 
But like many institutions that need to adapt to cope with modern challenges, 
football adjudication is changing too. Sian Massey recently became the first female to 
be appointed an assistant referee at an English Premiership League game, despite 
huge controversy about her being female. Apparently Ms Massey started refereeing in 
her teens and has been nurtured by the Football Association’s (‘FA’) development 
programme, as well as by a series of FA-appointed mentors and coaches, who have 
helped guide her through the early stages of her career.246 Further, goal-line 
technology will be used for the first time at the 2014 Soccer World Cup in Brazil this 
year. These developments should not be surprising.247  
 
The reform brought about by the Constitution Reform Act provides invaluable 
lessons for the JSC: (i) consultation leads to transparency; (ii) consultation leads to a 
better understanding of what the legal community and the broader public view as 
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desirable; (iii) there is no fixed formula for ‘fit and proper’ and ‘appropriately qualified’, 
and it seems best practice to keep an open mind about the evolving content thereof; 
(iv) technical ability, although important, is only one criteria amongst others, which 
should be assessed based on the court or tribunal in question; and (v) reform of 
judicial selection criteria must be accompanied by reform of judicial institutions.  
 
Should Mr Gauntlett have been appointed by the JSC in April 2011? Was the 
decision taken by the JSC irrational and unlawful? Did the JSC misconstrue its 
powers? Injustice, as I mentioned, is the outcome of having skewed neighbourly 
processes, including adjudicatory processes, where some are put at an unbearable 
disadvantage by the social, economic and political realities operating in that society. 
The JSC is responding to a broader constitutional mandate and rationalising process 
that the government is undertaking, which includes the introduction of important 
legislation to urgently reform the courts. 
 
The kinds of judges South Africa requires depends on what it sees as its most 
pressing social concerns and what type of answers are envisioned. I cannot say 
whether Mr Gauntlett should have been appointed or not because I do not know him 
and I cannot attest to his character. What I can say is that both the JSC and the HSF 
need to deepen their understanding of who judges should be, and the selection 
criteria proposed in this paper provide a good starting point for that process. In order 
to transform the judiciary we must first transform: (i) a limited and out-dated 
conception of ‘superior courts’; (ii) the understanding of what tasks judges actually 
perform at the different levels of superior court adjudication; and (iii) finally, our 
understanding of ‘merit’. This includes the concept of constitutional imagination; the 
ability to envision, to build, and to lead a community, including the legal community, 
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